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Essay 1 investigates an empirical link between institutional variables and the 
performance of firms based on cross-country firm-level survey data. Current empirical 
evidence based on this type of data is unsatisfactory because employing survey responses 
as direct measures of institutional concepts and using those to analyze the effects of 
institutions at the firm level would limit the researcher to findings only within countries 
effects.  This happens at the expense of losing inherent cross-country variation in 
institutions. Essay 1 offers a simple conceptual framework that decomposes survey 
responses for each firm into the average of their country and a residual firm-specific 
component. Importantly, the estimation results indicate that both variations have clearly 
different effects on growth of sales of firms.  
Essay 2 estimates the causal effects of economic shocks on the incidence of 
politically destabilizing events. The estimation is difficult due to the joint endogeneity 
between economic growth and events related to the political environment, which is 
  
addressed by the instrumental variable method. The variation in oil prices is used as an 
instrument for economic growth in the sample of small oil importing economies during 
1960 – 1999. In contrast to a common belief and OLS estimates, the most striking finding 
of the IV estimation is that higher economic growth has a strong and robust positive 
effect on the incidence of relatively peaceful unrest such as demonstrations, strikes and 
riots.  
Essay 3 studies the question of differences in economic growth rates between 
Democratic and Republican governorships in the United States.  The question is difficult 
to answer by simply comparing growth rates because the party affiliation is not randomly 
selected during elections. The empirical analysis employs the Regression Discontinuity 
Method to address the endogeneity in the party control variable. Focusing on very close 
elections permits the generation of quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of a 
“randomized” change in party control at the 50 percent threshold. When comparing 
Democratic with Republican governorships, the results are suggestive about the 
possibility of slightly worse performance of Democratic governors but the lack of 
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Chapter 1: Disentangling the Effects of Institutional Perceptions of 
Firms in Transition 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the role of institutions for development has attracted a considerable 
attention. It has been argued that institutions and institutional mechanisms for growth and 
development provide the "missing link" that explains differences in growth rates and 
development paths across countries.  Institutions are generally defined as “constraints that 
human beings impose on themselves” (North 1990).1 Most of the recent articles define 
institutions in a broader sense, linking various different measures of institutional quality 
to development outcomes from various angles and disciplines.  
There is a growing consensus regarding the importance of institutions for 
development, with many studies providing strong evidence at the macro level using such 
economic outcomes as growth and levels of income.2 The rapidly developing set of 
available institutional indexes for many countries has made it possible for such empirical 
efforts to achieve meaningful results. Cross-country comparisons have focused on 
determinants of growth and levels of income. Despite some weaknesses related to 
problems of definition, causalities and proper interpretation of findings, there is little 
doubt that cross-country variation in institutions is crucial for economic outcomes. 
                                                 
1 Other scholars include in their definition of institutional organizational units, procedural devices, and 
regulatory frameworks (Williamson 2000). 
2 Starting with early contributions by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) and more recent work of 
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar 
and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) have suggested the effects of good 




Further insights can be gained if one focuses on microeconomic channels linking 
institutions to macroeconomic outcomes. Why various countries' aggregate economic 
outcomes are so closely linked to their levels of institutional development? One obvious 
candidate for this transmission is the performance of firms and their behavior, which 
result from a particular institutional setting and related business environment.  
The micro-economic empirical evidence is limited not only in terms of the amount of 
the evidence produced but also in terms of the reliability of the data and, more 
importantly, of the interpretation of the results. The evidence is limited because 
quantifying institutions and their interactions with economic agents is an inherently 
difficult task. Available data is often of dubious quality or nonexistent, and many 
important aspects are not quantifiable. In order to obtain needed information, it has 
become increasingly popular to ask the general public, managers of firms, and officials 
their views about the performance of public institutions and levels of corruption. Such 
data are easy and relatively inexpensive to obtain, particularly in comparison with 
detailed information on the actual day-to-day operation of state institutions.  
Although the use of survey data has improved radically the potential of studying 
institutional influences at the micro level – putting aside issues related to the quality of 
collected data – there are significant methodological gaps in the empirical literature. 
Overall, the evidence is scattered and chaotic, very little attention is paid to conceptual 
basics about how to systematically approach the micro-level survey data and how to 
interpret its results. Typically, studies employ individual responses as direct measures of 
institutional concepts addressing, to a certain extent, the potential perception bias which 
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is considered to be one of the major issues. However, other important conceptual 
problems in some of the well cited literature need to be addressed. In particular, country 
dummies are often used to address problems of omitted unobservable effects.  This 
happens at the expense of losing inherent cross-country variation in institutions3. On the 
other hand, the interpretation of regressions without country fixed effects is 
unsatisfactory because these studies typically claim to capture “full” variation across 
countries.4 However, the analysis in this chapter shows that these regressions still capture 
“within” effects. Furthermore, this chapter argues that institutional measures drawn from 
surveys combine objective variation at the national level (countries) and variation in 
responses of managers conditional on the situation at the firm level. One would expect 
these sources of variation to have different effects and policy implications. This chapter 
offers a simple conceptual framework that decomposes survey responses for each firm 
into the average of their country and a residual firm-specific component. 
 Importantly, the results show that both variations have clearly different effects on 
firms’ performance variable in regressions. The estimation procedure uses the firm-level 
survey data (BEEPS, 2002) to examine the effects of the different institutions and 
specific characteristics of enterprises on the economic performance of the firms in 
transition measured by growth of sales. Institutional variables are quality of courts, 
regulatory burden, corruption, and obstacles to financing. The estimates of firm-level 
assessments of institutions on growth of firms can only provide within country effects: 
damaging effects of higher levels of regulatory burden, corruption, and obstacles in 
financing, beneficial effects of better quality of courts and more frequent bribing of 
                                                 
3 Hellman et al. (2003) is one of the most representative examples  
4 For instance, see Johnson et al. (2002)  
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legislators to influence laws and regulations (state capture). In contrast to firm-level 
estimates, we found a significant evidence of nonlinear effects of country-level 
corruption and regulatory burden on growth of sales of firms. The country-level 
regulatory burden measure displays a Laffer-type effect with respect to growth of sales 
while corruption appears to “ease” the impacts of higher regulation levels. State capture 
helps individual firms for a given country while such corruption has sizeable but less 
robust negative effects at the national level, which is a relatively scarce quantitative result 
in the literature that has only conjectured the negative country effects of capturing 
politicians. 
Overall, this chapter offers a conceptual framework to analyze firm-level institutional 
survey data in transition. Analyzing the experience of transition countries offers an 
additional advantage because it allows studying the behavior of economic agents in the 
rapidly changing institutional environment.5 
The analysis offers a straightforward framework in Section 1.2 and links it to existing 
literature; this model is also used as guidance to initial estimations steps. Section 1.3 
discusses some specification concerns. Section 1.4 describes the data and identifies the 
relevant variables and their measurement. Initial results in Section 1.5 show symptoms 
that induced more careful reconsideration of the functional form, while Section 1.6 
provides robustness tests and Section 1.7 concludes. 
                                                 
5 See Murrell (2003) for detailed analysis on evolution of institutions in transition. Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) also found empirically that institutional factors explaining property rights 
protection in former Socialist countries are different from institutional factors in other countries. 
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1.2 Analyzing Survey-Based Institutional Micro Data  
The cross-country studies mentioned in the introduction arrive at a consensus that 
institutional quality matters for growth.  Yet, some researchers question the relative 
importance of “institutions” versus other factors, like geography (Sachs 2003) and trade 
(Dollar and Kraay 2003).6 Whereas the earlier literature used variables such as political 
violence and civil liberties to proxy for institutions, the more recent literature focuses on 
measures that capture institutional quality by referring to the risk of expropriation, degree 
of corruption, quality of bureaucracy and strength of the rule of law (Kaufmann and 
Kraay 2002, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2002).  In this chapter, we will use 
variables similar to these last three.  This is because they seem not only to be important in 
the cross-country studies, but also appear to have the most significant effects on the 
performance of firms in the data under consideration. Furthermore, some authors point to 
the existing shortcomings of cross-country studies. The identified weaknesses relate to 
problems of definition, causalities and proper interpretation of findings (Glaeser et al. 
2004). Nevertheless, there is little doubt that cross-country variation in institutions is 
crucial for economic outcomes.  
The data on such variables as corruption, rule of law, and quality of bureaucracy is 
not easily available, given the fact that these concepts are very hard to quantify. 
Therefore, as institutional topics became very popular in the mid and late 1990’s, the use 
of micro surveys has become increasingly popular. Such surveys typically ask the general 
public, managers of firms, and officials to evaluate the performance of public institutions 
and levels of corruption. International organizations and development agencies, such as 
                                                 
6 See footnote 3 in Introduction section for additional references.  
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the World Bank, EBRD, and USAID, have been putting significant resources into 
conducting such surveys. In particular, since the mid-1990s the World Bank has been 
very active in conducting business surveys worldwide, especially in transition countries. 
For example, their publicly available databases include World Development Report 1997 
Business Survey, World Business Environment Survey 2000/01, Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 1999 and 2002. The surveys in similar 
fashion ask firms about key aspects of state institutions, such as business regulation and 
taxation, law and judiciary, as well as infrastructure and finance.  
Before going into the review of the existing evidence on cross-country micro 
institutional surveys, it is helpful to introduce a simple empirical framework for 
analyzing such data that is thought to be applicable for studying institutional effects on 
economic outcomes for and behavior of firms.  
1.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
There are several factors that may affect individual responses to questions evaluating 
institutions in a survey. Fist of all, a situation at the country level should determine 
variation across countries. If the number of respondents is sufficient, a simple averaging 
of individual scores in a particular country should provide a reasonable measure of 
country-level institutions that can be compared across countries. 
Within a country, individual answers are determined not only by the national level but 
may also significantly deviate from it because of specific situation at a given firm, 
available information set and individual respondent’s characteristics. Situations at the 
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firm may vary and depend upon the firm's specific characteristics, such as industry, 
ownership structure and history, location, size, and age of the firm. These can be included 
as controls in our model. In addition, individual responses may be affected by any new 
relevant information on the basis of which the preexisting opinion is updated. New 
information may be the result of a very recent experience or can be based on other trusted 
sources; it may be common and shared among everybody in the same country, but it can 
also be specific to an individual. Moreover, the way information is processed may vary 
between managers due to their personal characteristics, such as analytical abilities, age, 
education, political beliefs, and personality in terms of the level of skepticism, criticism, 
or cynicism. In sum, at any given point in time, the respondents in the same country may 
have different opinions about the same institution. As one can see in Appendix 1.1, Table 
A1.2, averages of standard deviations of institutional measures within countries are much 
higher than averages of standard deviations of these variables across countries in BEEPS 
2002 data. 
It is important to examine the effects of individual valuations of institutions, since 
they certainly affect a firm’s investment and restructuring decisions, as well as other 
strategic business decisions, such as product innovation, hiring policies, and so forth. 
Therefore, both country level measure of institutions and an individual manager's 
valuation of institutions directly determine the firm's business outcomes. One does not 
want to count the effect of the national variation twice.  Thus, the individual effects can 
be measured as deviations from the national level. If the outcomes of the firm's business 
behavior and strategies are observed through its performance, we can write a simple 
equation describing the effects of institutions:  
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isississis uZXXXY ++−++= θγβα )( ,    s=1,…, S   i = 1,…, Is  (1.1) 
where i,s are firm and country subscripts, Yis is the measure of the performance of firms. 
isX  represents the firm-level measure of institutions, sX  represents the national level of 
the quality of the institution measured as an equally weighted average of all individual 
responses within the country, and  Zis is the vector of specific characteristics of firms.  In 
equation (1.1), β represents the cross-country effects of institutions while γ  indicates the 
effect of the firm-level institutional variable measured by manager’s opinion in the 
survey. The latter reflects varying degree of institutional constraints for different firms 
within countries. For instance, bigger firms may have easier access to finance (Beck et al. 
2005).  
To attain further insights, it is useful to see the connection between equation (1.1) and 
the country fixed effects model that is widely used in the literature. From (1.1), 
isisissis uZXXY +++−+= θγγβα )(    (1.2) 
By averaging equation (1.2) over i’s within s, one obtains cross-country equation, which 
only uses variation between countries: 
,)( sssss uZXXY +++−+= θγγβα     (1.3) 
Subtraction of equation (1.3) from equation (1.2) for each i results in the fixed effects 




sissississis uuZZXXYY −+−+−=− θγ )()(     or 
isisisis uZXY ~
~~~ ++= θγ       (1.4) 
Estimating equation (1.4) is equivalent to estimating: 
isisissis vZXY +++= θγα ,    (1.5) 
Different intercepts sα  are capturing systematic differences in the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables across countries and γ's represent within country firm-level effects. 
For example, country dummies would control for cross-country differences in 
institutions. Note that estimating the effects of deviations of individual measures from the 
national level in equation (1.1) is equivalent to capturing the within country effects of 
individual measures in country fixed effects specifications (1.4) and (1.5).  
Equation (1.1) will become the main equation of interest. This simple framework will 
also allow one to see drawbacks in existing literature that deal with cross-country micro-
level data. In particular, the country fixed effects specification (1.5) will only provide 
estimates of γ or within country effects of the variation in measures of institutions at the 
firm-level, and the researcher does not obtain any information on β, i.e. missing 
completely cross-country differences.  On the other hand, exclusion of country-level 
controls sX  in estimation implies that the )( γβ −  term in (1.2) is restricted to zero, 
effectively imposing the condition that cross-country impacts are equal to within country 
effects, which may not be true. 
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1.2.2 Existing Evidence 
The styles and approaches of the research work analyzing the aforementioned cross-
country surveys can be summarized by some examples in the literature.  
The work of Johnson et al. (2002) uses the perception survey in five transition 
countries to show that perceived weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting 
their profits irrespective of whether the external finance is available or not.  The authors 
use both specifications with and without country dummies. They acknowledge that much 
of the variation in the security of property rights is across countries rather than within 
country; therefore, specification without country dummies captures the full effects of 
property rights. However, according to the logic introduced earlier in the previous 
section, such interpretation of the results is misleading since the model without country 
dummies would still capture the variation in perceptions within country imposing the 
restriction that cross-country effects are the same as individual effects. Consider a simple 
bivariate regression model: 
isisis XbaY ε++=  
If the correct model is  
ississis uXXXY +−++= )(γβα  









bE     (1.6) 
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Johnson et al. (2002) did not find much difference in the estimates for regressions 
with and without country dummies, which led them to conclude that within country 







XX  is rather small for all institutional measures in the data used in our 
work. For instance, the value of this ratio for state capture variable is 0.026, so that the 
term (β – γ) is deflated by 36 times.7 We suggest that they found in both cases within 
countries firm-level effects of perceived insecurity of property rights.  
Hellman et al. (2000) review the results of a subset of questions from the 1999 
BEEPS relating to governance and corruption, as well as detailing the sample structure 
and methodology. The results are reported at the country level and several governance 
indices are also constructed on the basis of different dimensions of governance. On the 
basis of this data, Hellman et al. (2003) studied state capture and influence in transition 
economies. They first analyzed the determinants of being a captor or an influential firm 
then try to find the effect of these two on the firm’s performance controlling for country 
fixed effects and the firm characteristics. In their study, state captors are “firms that make 
private payments to public officials to affect rules of the game,” while influential firms 
are those “that have influence on those rules without recourse to private payments to 
public officials”.8 The relevant survey question about state capture was: "How often do 
firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials to influence 
                                                 
7 Smallest inverse value of the ratio was 16.7 for the quality of courts, 18.2 -- for regulatory burden, and 
about 19 --  for corruption and state capture measures 
8 Although such distinction could be applied to the early years of the transition, but after almost a decade 
such difference seems not to be relevant.  Nowadays, as the author’s personal observations based on 
anecdotal evidence suggest that influential firms typically reward officials in one way or another for 
received favors.  Moreover, the “influence” question in the survey did not specify whether the influence 
was accompanied with private payments, so one cannot really distinguish between the two. 
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new laws, decrees and regulations?" The authors claim that they found that state captors 
enjoy higher growth rates of sales. Finally, all specifications use country-fixed effects 
and; therefore, cross-country effects are not available.     
Carlin et al. (2001) investigated factors that influence restructuring by firms and their 
subsequent performance by using BEEPS 1999 data. They specifically analyzed the 
impact of the competition, ownership, soft budget constraints, general business 
environment, and a range of measures about the intensity of competition as perceived by 
managers of firms. The institutional influences were not a major concern of their study 
and were summarized as a business environment measure by using a principal component 
method combining the different perceptions of obstacles in corruption, macroeconomic 
instability, tax administration, business licensing, financing, and crime. They found that 
the competition and restructuring effects on performance are very strong and robust, and 
privatization is not significant.  Yet, they caution that such results may be affected by the 
selection bias. The business environment measure becomes less significant after 
controlling for endogeneity by applying the method of instrumental variables to a country 
fixed-effect model.  As instruments they use the interaction of a firm-level competition 
measure with the country dummy, claiming that in this way the differences across 
countries in business environments are modeled. The validity of such an approach is not 
very well explained in the study, so that immediate doubts arise since the competition 
measure itself enters directly into the performance equation. The fact that they validate 
their instruments by the test of overidentifying restrictions is not convincing, as the test 




Fries et al. (2003) provided an overview and summarized the main findings of the 
2002 BEEPS survey. They divided measures of the business environment into qualitative 
and quantitative measures. By comparing qualitative measures with objective statistical 
measures and quantitative survey measures, they concluded that these appear to provide 
reasonably accurate measures across various dimensions of the business environment and 
countries. Among other things, they examine the effects of country-level aggregate 
demand growth, quality of the business environment, and firm-level factors on enterprise 
performance measured by real growth in fixed assets, trend changes in productivity, and 
real sales growth. Results show that firms engaged in state capture enjoy higher 
investment rates and revenue growth rates while firms that report being affected by state 
capture have slightly lower estimated parameters due to external costs of capture. In 
relation to our analysis, the state capture effects are estimated only at the firm-level but 
not at the national level. Fries et al. (2003) also found that the country-level index for the 
quality of the business environment is positively associated with higher investment rates 
but not with growth of sales, which is attributed to multicollinearity with the aggregate 
output growth term. In contrast with other studies reviewed here, Fries et al. (2003) 
considered only the variation across countries in aggregated measure of the business 
environment but not the individual level effects on performance of firms.    
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) study how growth of firms is related 
to financial, legal and corruption obstacles and whether these effects vary with the size of 
the firms. Similarly, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) compare the 
effects of a broader set of institutional obstacles on growth of firms. Both studys use the 
World Business Environment Survey 2000 (WBES). It is very similar to BEEPS survey 
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but covers more countries. Authors examine the effects of firm-level measures of 
institutional obstacles on growth of sales. Beck et al. (2005) do control for country-level 
inflation, income per capita, income growth and external to survey measures of financial 
and legal development while Ayyagari et al. (2005) control only for levels of GDP per 
capita. The estimation framework is country random effects model. However, the random 
effect model assumes that unobserved country-level error component is not correlated 
with observed explanatory variables, which is a very strong assumption. If such 
correlation is present then random effect estimator is inconsistent (Wooldridge 2001, p. 
257). Beck et al. (2005) found that perceptions of managers about financial, legal and 
corruption obstacles are significantly related to the firm’s growth. They also found that 
smaller firms are more constrained while country’s financial and legal development 
weakens these constraints especially for smaller firms9. Ayyagari et al. (2005) find that 
most important obstacles for growth of firms are obstacles related to financing, political 
instability and crime. Separate effects of country averages in obstacles are not considered 
in Beck et al. (2005). However, country averages of obstacles measures are used as 
instruments for firm-level variables. 
Among other empirical studys, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Gaviria (2002) use 
business survey databases to investigate the effects of corruption and regulation. 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) separately ran cross-country and within country regressions to 
find that bribery increases the time spent with public officials, arguing that this result is 
inconsistent with the enhancing role of corruption. Gaviria (2002) also used a similar 
dataset to investigate how corruption impacts the growth of sales and investment in firms. 
                                                 
9 Country-level institutional variables are interacted with the firm’s sizes. 
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He abstracts from cross-country differences and finds that at the firm-level, the 
corruption measure negatively affects economic performance. 
In summary, cross-country studies show that institutional differences across countries 
matter a lot. Furthermore, most of firm-level studies use country-fixed effects estimation 
and ignore cross-country variation in institutions. Finally, often cited study of Johnson et 
al. (2002) claims to capture “full” effects by not using country dummies, which is 
misleading as their regressions, in fact, capture only within country  individual firm’s 
effects.  
1.3 Specification and Estimation Issues 
To avoid the problem of missing cross-country variation, we chose a specification that 
uses both within and between countries variations in institutional variables, as in equation 
(1): 
isississis uZXXXY ++−++= θγβα )(  s=1,…, S  i = 1,…, Is   
The major caveat with estimated γ’s is the reverse causation problem. The manager, 
who is unhappy with the current and past performance of the firm, is likely to report more 
negative assessments of existing aspects of institutions as opposed to the reports of a 
happier manager whose firm performs better (perception bias). For instance, if the 
measure of corruption negatively affects growth of sales in OLS regression, the feedback 
effect from growth is likely to induce downward bias in OLS estimates so that γOLS < γ. 
The explicit and accurate correction for this type of endogeneity is beyond the scope 
of this study but Appendix 1.4 provides a crude assessment of the problem. It has been 
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found that the problem is likely to be small in our sample. In addition, all the sensitivity 
tests in subsequent sections of the chapter display a remarkable robustness of the firm-
level estimates. Moreover, Fries et al. (2003) also conclude that the extent of the 
perception bias in the BEEPS 2002 data is not significant. Beck et al. (2005) in their 
robustness tests found that their γ’s are not very sensitive to employing IV estimation.  
Nevertheless, one needs to be careful with the interpretation of the firm-level estimates 
and evaluate whether the signs of estimated coefficients agree with the possible direction 
of expected bias. 
Feedback effects are unlikely to be sizeable and systematic from an individual firm’s 
performances to country measures of institutions; therefore, β’s are likely to be 
unaffected by reverse causation.  
The country-fixed effects framework suggests that γ's are unbiased and consistent 
with respect to a country’s unobserved variables in the absence of other sources of biases.  
Other problems may arise in estimating the model. One concern is that error terms are 
correlated within each country, if one expects that firms share unobservable 
characteristics. It would be reasonable to assume that observations are independently 
distributed across countries. However, error terms within countries may not be 
independent.  The OLS estimators are still unbiased but not efficient (Wooldridge 2001, 
Moulton 1990). The standard procedure in the applied work is to use clustering methods 
to correct estimated standard errors. Statistical packages, such as Stata, allow for the 
computation of standard errors that are robust to arbitrary within cluster correlation as 
well as arbitrary heteroskedasticity. However, the asymptotic theory of clustering 
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methods justifies using clustering methods when the number of groups is infinite. The 
robust variance matrix for a pooled OLS estimator with a small number of clusters S can 
behave poorly (Wooldridge 2001, p.331, 2003, 2006, Donald and Lang 2005, Cameron et 
al.2006). When S is very small, Wooldridge (2003) notes that estimating β relying on a 
large S asymptotic can be misleading, often resulting in a downward bias in estimates of 
standard errors.  In our study, there are 25 countries and 140-333 firms within countries. 
There is no explicit recommendation in the literature about how large the number of 
groups should be in order to get reliable standard errors estimates. In panel data, Kezdi 
(2004) uses Monte Carlo simulations to show that the fixed effects estimator (γ), adjusted 
for clustering, works reasonably well when the number of cross-sections (S between 10 
and 50) is not large relative to the time dimension. Cameron et al. (2006) show in their 
simulations that for S=25 standard cluster method performs reasonably well and 
estimates of standard errors are more accurate than those obtained from the unadjusted 
OLS estimator. Hence, we chose to use a standard clustering adjustment in our 
regressions. 
1.4 Survey and Institutional Measures 
1.4.1 Sample 
The survey covers over 6000 firms surveyed in 2002 in the following 25 countries: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia 




The survey included a minimum of 170 firms from each country, with larger samples 
in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (around 500 firms). Firms were sampled randomly from 
business directories, although minimum quotas were imposed for state-owned firms, size 
of firms, and industries.10  
About 62 percent of the firms in the sample were newly established private firms, 
13.8 percent were state-owned (more than 50 percent of shares), and 15.2 percent of the 
firms were privatized, having zero or minor state ownership. The sample is dominated by 
small and medium-sized enterprises: 68 percent of the sampled firms employed fewer 
than 50 persons, 19 percent employed between 50 and 250 people, and 14 percent were 
large firms. 39 percent of the firms were in industry while the rest were in services. 
About 32 percent of the firms were located in the capital, 20 percent were in large and 
medium sized cities (>250000), 23 percent were in small cities (50000-250000) and the 
remaining 25 percent in towns and rural areas. (see Table 1.1) 
Table 1.1 Basic firm characteristics of the sample 
Characteristic Sample share 
(in per cent) 
Sector 
     Industry  
      Services  
Size (Number of employees) 
      Small (2 to 49) 
     Medium (50 to 249)  
     Large (250 to 9,999)  
Ownership 
      New private  
      Privatized  
      State owned 
Location 
     Capital  
     Large cities (not capital)  
     Small cities  


















                                                 
10 A very detailed description of the BEEPS 2002 data can be found in Fries et al. 2003 
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1.4.2 Performance of Firms – Growth of Sales 
The growth of sales was used as the dependent variable reflecting the firm’s performance. 
Entrepreneurs were asked for the real growth of sales over the previous three years. The 
concern here is the accuracy of the survey measures. It is quite possible that not all 
managers knew the exact economic meaning of the term "real." In addition, responses 
critically depend upon translations and the ability of interviewers to explain the question. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of more precise measures from accounting records or firms' 
annual reports, survey-based measures do provide useful information on the performance 
that can be compared among firms.   
In the sample, 30.4 percent of firms reported negative growth rates of in sales per worker 
and 61.5 percent reported positive growth. 
 1.4.3 Measuring Institutions 
The survey asks the managers of firms their views about the performance of public 
institutions and the incidence of corruption. If the goal is to assess the actual performance 
of institutions, one must first know the degree to which the public's image reflects what 
the function of an institution and how well it accomplishes this function. Unfortunately, 
there is a substantial risk that such an opinion tells us less about the supposedly sad state 
of an institution and more about the sad state of the opinion, or worse, public 
misinformation that may originate in an incomplete information problem. There are 
important differences in how an institution is perceived depending on whether that 
perception is based on personal experience or indirect sources such as rumor and news 
reports. Although managers in the BEEPS survey are less likely to be biased in 
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comparison to an average citizen, as their perceptions are formed in the firm’s day-to-day 
interactions with institutions, the above concerns still remain.  There is also formal 
evidence that perception bias is not significant problem in BEEPS survey (Fries et al. 
2003) and in a very similar WBES survey (Beck et al. 2005).  
Table 1.2 shows correlations among survey country measures used in the study and 
the 2002 World Bank’s index of regulatory quality, and the Transparency International 
(TI) corruption index (see definitions of the variables in Appendix 1.5).  
 Table 1.2 Correlations of country averages with external to survey measures 
 
                  External  
Survey 
WB Regulatory Quality TI Corruption Index State Capture 2 
Regulatory Burden -0.39*** -0.47*** 0.09*** 
Corruption 0.48*** -0.75*** 0.13*** 
State Capture  -0.01 -0.07*** 0.72*** 
*** significant at 1 percent level 
Overall these correlations show consistency among measures. There is a high 
correlation between corruption and state capture measures while the regulatory burden 
correlation coefficient is lower. This is because the World Bank’s measure of regulatory 
quality has broader coverage of related issues than our variable measured as time tax with 
officials. In addition, the better regulatory quality does not necessarily imply that the time 
spent with officials to comply with regulations should be less. In the hypothetical 
extreme, the absence of regulations implies zero time spent with public officials but this 
certainly does not indicate that the regulatory quality is high.  
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1.4.4 Institutions and Survey Questions 
The survey offers a wide scope of questions for institutional variables. We can roughly 
divide them into several broad categories shown in Table 1.3.   
Our goal is to find measures for institutions that best explain their economic 
performance. Many raw institutional measures are highly correlated to each other so 
picking the most powerful explanatory variables is not an easy task.11 We used Hendry’s 
approach (Hendry 1979), which starts with a very general model that is over-
parameterized, and which is subsequently reduced on the basis of significance tests. By 
using Hendry’s “general to specific” approach, all raw measures that can potentially 
affect the firms’ performance were included in the equation, which created a great deal of 
noise in the regression coefficients, so the specification was progressively simplified by 
eliminating variables with low significance to arrive at a final specification that included 
only one or two variables from each broad category12. 
In particular, the business regulations category was left with “time tax” variable, 
which we thereafter refer to as “regulatory burden.” “Corruption” and “state capture” 
categories retained the percentage of sales paid in unofficial payments and frequency of 
bribing of legislators respectively. The rule of law group retained the quality of courts 
variable which was constructed with the help of the factor analysis discussed in the 
Appendix 1.2. The financial system was left with the “obstacles in financing” measure in 
obstacles for business environment question.   
                                                 
11 See Appendix 1.3 for correlations 




Table 1.3. Questions and grouping for institutional variables13 
 
Business regulations • Consistency and predictability of laws and regulations; Q46, 49 
• Customs and trade regulations (# of days for custom clearance); Q25 
• Ability to get correct treatment from another official; Q51 
• Time tax (% of time spent with officials); Q50 
Corruption • Public procurement kickbacks (% of contract value); Q57 
• Tax compliance (% of sales reported to authorities); Q58 
• Unofficial payments (how common, Q54; how often Q56, Q54;  as % 
of sales, Q55)  
State Capture • Payments to influence laws  &regulations, how often Q56j 
• State capture’s impact on the business, Q59;  
Rule of Law • Quality of the courts, Q41 
• Security and protection payments, Q44 
• Security of property and contract rights, Q42 
Financial system 
 
• Use of accounting standards and external audit, Q73-74 
• Use of Collaterals (value; requirements) and loan terms, Q65 
• Sources of Finance, Q64 
• Obstacles to Financing,  Q80a 
• Prevalence Government subsidies, Q79 
More specifically, the time tax question supposedly measures the regulatory burden, 
and is given by responses to the question about the percentage of the senior 
management’s time spent in 2001 in dealing with public officials about application and 
interpretation of laws and regulation and to acquire or maintain access to public services. 
The responses to this question are perhaps less sensitive to subjectivity relative to another 
survey question about government quality, as we believed that managers reported their 
actual proportion of devoted time, although individual mistakes in reports may be 
present. Our corruption measure seems to capture the more general level and is given by 
the reported percentage of total annual sales firms typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials. The measure of the state capture is given by responses 
to the question about how often firms would make unofficial payments/gifts to influence 
                                                 
13 Emboldened text indicates preferred measures. Notation Q# refers to the question number in the actual 
survey. Exact formulation of questions and correlations within groups can be found in the Appendix 1.3. 
Full survey questionnaire is available at  http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm 
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the content of new laws, decrees, etc. (from 1="never" to 6="always"). Finally, the 
financial aspect of the business environment includes the measure of obstacles for 
operation and growth in access to financing with scales from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major 
obstacle). Our institutional measures are summarized in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4. Descriptive Statistics: ississis ZandXXXY )(,, −  
  Variable Level Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs 
Growth of 
Sales, Y 
Firms 25.20 79.05 -600 990 5736 
Country 0.00 0.22 -0.40 0.43 5977 Courts 
Quality 
Firm  0.00 0.88 -1.93 3.03 4766 
Country 7.88 2.72 2.79 12.41 5977 Regulatory 
Burden 
Firm, % 0.00 11.55 -12.4 78.4 5656 
Country 1.59 0.78 0.34 3.70 5977 Corruption 
Firm,%  0.00 3.20 -3.7 48.5 5455 
Country 1.40 0.17 1.13 1.95 5977 State Capture 
Firm 0.00 0.93 -0.95 4.8 5166 
Country 2.31 0.27 1.62 2.80 5977 Financial 
Obstacles 
Firm 0.00 1.14 -1.79 2.38 5637 
Firms' Age  14.68 18.71 3 202 5977 
Ln(Size)  3.19 1.75 0.69 9.21 5948 
Firm-level variables are deviations of survey scores isX  from the mean sX  
Note that many survey questions use ordinal scales in the questionnaire, and many 
studies treat these variables as continuous in the models. However, as the distance 
between the response categories of an ordinal variable are generally unknown, assuming 
the continuity is possibly inappropriate. On the other hand, one can consider scales to be 
ordinal with approximately equal intervals between categories. We can examine this 
simplifying assumption by entering these variables in the model as category dummies, to 
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test if differences between subsequent categories are the same. All the variables with 
ordinal scales have passed this test (results are not shown). 
1.4.5 Controls 
The firms' specific characteristics need to be included to assess the determinants of the 
firms' performance.  
The age of the firm is included as a control variable since firms are likely to enjoy 
higher returns and be more flexible for restructuring in the earlier stages of operation. 
The logarithm for the size of the firm is also included as a control measured by the 
number of employees. Large firms may have different market conditions or enjoy 
economies of scale or monopoly power. Also, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2005) find that the effects of corruption, financial and legal constraints on the growth of 
firms depend on firm sizes.  
The firms in the sample can be categorized as being state-owned (more than 50 
percent of ownership) and private. Moreover, private firms can be divided into old firms 
that have been privatized from the state, and new private firms. It seems to be a general 
observation in the literature that public enterprises are less efficient than private ones 
(Megginson and Netter 2001). Djankov and Murrell (2002) use the statistical technique 
of meta-analysis to synthesize the empirical results of over 100 studies and found that the 
effects of ownership are very important for firms in transition. The regressions below 
include the dummies new private and state to control for these differences so the omitted 
category will be privatized firms.  
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Dummy variables for the different categories of city sizes are also included as 
controls, since clearly there are larger markets in bigger cities. Sector dummies are 
included as well.  
Another important variable is the degree of market power that firms face in the 
market. The firms were asked what the result would be had they raised real prices by 10 
percent with the scale of 1 – "customers would continue to buy in the same quantities", 
and 4 – "many customers would switch to competitors".  
1.5 Results 
Table 1.5 presents the main results of the chapter. It contains four specifications that 
outline and support the main ideas introduced in previous sections. The results of the 
regressions are very interesting and provide important insights into what perception-
based data can tell about a firm's economic outcomes. First, column (1) shows estimates 
of the regression that does not include country dummy variables while column (2) 
controls for country-fixed effects. The estimates of these specifications can be compared 
to see whether there are substantial differences in estimates. If our model is correct and 
differences are substantial, then this may indicate that the coefficients in (1) are biased 
because of omitted country-level variables. To account for cross-country differences, 
column 3 includes country-level measures of institutional variables, as well as deviations 
of individual observations from country averages. In comparison to firms–perceptions 
effects, column (3) estimates show that three out of five country level institutional 
variables have opposite signs, although large standard errors make these coefficients 
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insignificant. Subsequently, Specifications 4 is an attempt to resolve these paradoxical 
opposite signs. 
 
1.5.1 Specifications 1 vs. 2 
It seems that within country variation of firm-level measures of institutions is very 
important for their performances, and evidence is generally consistent with other 
researchers’ findings.14 
The specification (1) in Table 1.5 does not control for country differences while (2) 
includes country dummies so that coefficient estimates represent within country effects of 
the firms' perceptions of the institutions on their performances. We disagree here with 
Johnson et. al (2002) that estimates in column (1) indicate the full effects of institutional 
indices that combine both across and within country variation. Rather, they show the 
influence of variation in firm-level measures of institutions within countries. Note that 
the estimates of γ’s in column (2) are not subject to the country level omitted variable 
bias and the noticeable differences in estimates between columns (1) and (2) should tell 
us whether the coefficients in (1) are sensitive to omitted country level influences 
because estimates in (1) can be viewed as γ’s in (2) affected by the omitted cross-country 
variation. 
Both (1) and (2) show that quality of courts variable at the firm level has a positive 
sign and is marginally significant in (2) at 10 percent level. This result is consistent with 
already existing evidence that better legal institutions promote economic growth and 
                                                 
14 Hendley et al. (2000, 2001), Murrell (2003), Johnson et al.( 2002), Murrell (2005), Beck et al. (2005), 
Ayyagari et al. (2005) Hellman et al. (2003), Fries et al. (2003) 
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better trust in courts improves performances (Hendley et al. 2000, 2001, Murrell 2003, 
Johnson et al. 2002, Murrell 2005, Beck et al. 2005).  
The corruption and regulatory burden coefficients in column (1) are almost two times 
smaller in absolute value than within country estimates in (2), which implies that there 
are important omitted cross country effects for these variables. This becomes evident in 
columns (3) and (4) where country level variables are included in the estimation. State 
capture is advantageous, which is consistent with existing evidence found by Hellman et 
al. (2003) and Fries et al. (2003) analysis of BEEPS1 and BEEPS2 surveys. The 
estimated influence of perceived obstacles in financing is negative and significant at the 
10 percent level. 
1.5.2 Specifications 3 and 4 
In specification (3), Table 1.5, note that firms’ specific coefficients are very similar to 
within countries estimates in column (2), which is not surprising as they should both be 
asymptotically equal to γ's in the model.  
One can see that country-level effects are much bigger in absolute values although the 
coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Three institutional variables constructed as 
countries' averages have opposite signs as compared to firms' perception effects. These 
variables are regulatory burden, corruption, and state capture measured respectively as 




The negative sign of the state capture variable is not surprising and is consistent with 
the hypothesis that state capture at the country level is associated with external negative 
spillovers on other firms. This is consistent with literature that suggests negative country 
effects of capturing politicians (Hellman et al. 2003 and 2002, Fries et al. 2003).  
However, country level estimates of the effects of regulatory burden and corruption 
show positive effects on firms’ performance with the former being statistically significant 
at only 10 percent. Does this really tell us that more regulations and corruption improve 
economic outcomes or that relationships are more complex than simply adding effects 
separately in the estimated regression? 15 
The idea of the implausibility of the simple additive functional form in our model is 
evident by looking more carefully at regulatory burden impacts. It is important to note 
that the time burden spent with officials may be correlated with the quality of regulatory 
environment but does not directly measure the latter. Clearly, there are benefits to 
imposing regulations, which can not be underestimated. A simple textbook interpretation 
of such benefits would be the correction of market failures. Creation of antitrust laws and 
regulations is one of the most cited examples. A very low level of regulatory 
requirements may be harmful for competition: it may create room for favoritism and 
discretion, and more generally reflect a weak level of institutional development, whereas 
excessive regulations would create significant obstacles in the business environment and 
subsequent waste of resources. Guriev (2003) also notes that the socially optimal level of 
red tape is not trivial and a zero level is not desirable. Therefore, we suggest a “Laffer” 
                                                 
15 The importance of non-linear effects of country-level institutional variables on firm’s perceptions of 
security in property rights are also found by Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006). 
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type of relationship between regulations and the performance of firms so that the 
appropriate functional form for regulatory burden is quadratic. To our knowledge, such 
an empirical test has never been performed in the existing literature. 
Furthermore, the models from (1) to (3) in Table 1.5 assume that the impact of 
corruption is the same for all levels of the regulatory burden and vice-versa. This 
condition seems to be restrictive since the change in response with one variable may 
depend on the other or the effects of corruption may be modified by levels of the 
regulatory burden. The “efficient grease” hypothesis (Huntington 1969, Krueger 1974, 
and Lui 1985) suggests an efficiency enhancing role of corruption. Lui (1996) argued that 
corruption may be efficient under some circumstances, but it reduces growth because of 
misdirection or misallocation of the human capital towards rent-seeking activity. In our 
case, corruption may help firms to avoid excessive regulation at a given point of time; 
therefore, the use of the interaction term for corruption and regulatory burden is needed if 
the former is modified by the latter.  
Consider a modified fragment of the regression equation (1.1): 
 ...)()( 534
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β is expected to be positive. The 
negative effect of corruption is modified by the level of regulations so that at very high 
levels of regulations the net effect of sC  can be positive. The inverted U-shape 
relationship between Yis and sR  implies that the coefficient 3β  is expected to be 
negative.  
If we add both nonlinear terms into a regression equation, as in column (4), the 
estimated coefficients show that the above hypotheses about nonlinear relationships are 
supported by the data.  
The data shows a negative and significant 4β coefficient, which is related to the 
separate effects of countries’ corruption. Based on the coefficients in column (4), the 
marginal effect of corruption becomes positive at the regulatory burden levels greater 
than sR = 5.55. Seven countries in the sample have levels of sR below this value: Czech 
Republic, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia, and Croatia. 
The negative estimate of 3β  makes regulatory burden harmful for firms at levels 
greater than a certain point, 
∗
sR .  In order to assess whether the sizes of coefficients are 
meaningful, it is informative to relate the resulted country-level regression lines to actual 












−= , then  ∗sR  for Russia, for instance, would be 
7.5216 while the actual data point is =sR 9.79. Figure 1 shows several country profiles 
where firm’s growth of sales is a function of the country’s level of regulatory burden. The 
fitted lines are drawn on the basis of the coefficients in column (4), Table 1.5, where 
firm-level variables are used as countries’ means. The actual data points seem to lie close 
to plotted lines which indicate that the sizes of estimated coefficients are reasonable, at 
least not too big or too small. Although the magnitude of the results should be treated 
with caution due to the possible omitted variable bias, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients are informative and support the idea of the non-trivial quadratic functional 
form for the regulatory burden variable and short-term modifying effects of corruption 
for higher levels of regulatory burden.  
1.5.3 Controls 
Controls of firms' seem to be very significant and robust in all specifications. The ages of 
firms have a slightly negative effect on performance. Bigger firms, private start-ups, and 
firms located in big cities perform better according to all specifications. However, one 
has to take into consideration the feedback effect from performance to the size of the firm 
and ownership structure. Better performance would tend to increase the size of the firm 
and may have an effect on the ownership structure. Accounting for this bias is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Corruption index in the data is 1.43, see Appendix 1.1.  
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Table 1.5 Regression results for Firms’ Growth of Sales 
 





in Regulatory Burden 
and Corruption 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  

















Courts' Quality 2.1 2.23 13.97 2.03 7.94 2.07  
 [1.51] [1.15]* [14.79] [1.17]* [14.94] [1.15]*  
Regulatory Burden -0.13 -0.24 1.80 -0.23 7.57 -0.23  
 [0.10] [0.08]*** [0.94]* [0.08]*** [3.43]** [0.08]***  
(Regulatory     -0.78   
                   Burden) ^ 2     [0.29]**   
Corruption -0.49 -0.7 5.00 -0.7 -16.88 -0.70  
 [0.30] [0.31]** [4.26] [0.31]** [8.24]* [0.31]**  
Reg. Burden X       3.04   
                     Corruption      [1.07]***    
State Capture 4.17 4.38 -16.18 4.55 -16.16 4.50  
  [1.94]** [1.97]** [15.38] [1.95]** [13.17] [1.95]**  
Obstacles in Financing -2.48 -2.17 -14.05 -1.95 -5.97 -2.03  
   [1.37]* [1.10]* [10.04] [1.08]* [8.66] [1.09]*  
Firms' Age -0.43 -0.32 -0.38 -0.37  
 [0.05]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]***  
Ln(Size) 7.36 6.67 7.28 7.21  
 [0.89]*** [0.84]*** [0.85]*** [0.86]***  
State -12.3 -11.09 -12.15 -11.42  
  [3.84]*** [3.53]*** [3.83]*** [3.93]***  
New Private 7.23 9.79 8.22 9.02  
 [3.17]** [3.12]*** [2.85]*** [2.87]***  
Lack of Market Power -5.28 -4.37 -5.23 -5.08  
               [1.42]*** [1.16]*** [1.39]*** [1.38]***  
Big City 37.75 25.94 34.15 35.17  
 [5.49]*** [6.09]*** [6.50]*** [6.82]***  
Medium City -7.92 -8.21 -9.39 -9.15  
 [7.19] [5.81] [5.76] [5.83]  
Small City -4.96 -5.91 -5.27 -6.94  
 [3.44] [3.32]* [3.20] [3.11]**  
Town/ Village -0.91 -0.78 0.12 -1.02  
            [4.40] [4.31] [4.18] [4.08]  
Constant 6.65 -9.54 37.86 23.44  
 [11.12] [10.62] [25.35] [25.64]  
Obs 3499 3499 3499 3499  
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07  
 
 
Robust and Robust Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Sector controls are included in all 















































1.6 Robustness Tests 
If the country-level estimates in column (4) of Table 1.5 are prone to an omitted variable 
bias, we can use relevant country-level variables to check whether the results in (4) are 
robust to inclusion of such variables. 
1.6.1 GDP Growth Rates  
 
Some groups of countries in the sample have experienced different timings for transition 
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Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries (CEB), South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In terms of economic progress, CEB 
countries experienced the lowest and a shorter initial decline during 1989-1992 and the 
fastest recovery and growth by the end of 1990s. On the other hand, CIS countries 
suffered longer and more severe declines until the late 1990s. Only in recent years did 
they display stable and high growth rates exceeding those in CEB and SEE since 1999 
(see EBRD 2004). As the survey was conducted in 2002, aggregate growth rates and 
reported firms’ growth of sales rates as well as institutional scores can be correlated. So 
column (2) in Table 1.6 includes countries’ GDP growth rates in 2000 to test the 
sensitivity of the results. An increase in countries’ GDP growth rate of 1 percent is 
associated with a 2.07 percent growth in sales of firms. In comparison to column (1), 
signs of estimates do not change, country-level coefficients for Regulatory Burden and 
Corruption are now higher in absolute value, but the estimated effects of State Capture 
and Financial Obstacles are smaller in absolute values. 
1.6.2 Infrastructure 
From the survey, we also construct the index Lack of Infrastructure. BEEPS 2002 survey 
provides ratings of the quality and efficiency of public services related to infrastructure 
like roads, postal service, power, telephone and water. This index was constructed by 
calculating the equally weighted mean ratings of telecommunication, electricity, and 
transportation services at the individual firm level, which was then averaged over firms 
within countries. Both country level ratings and firm-level deviations from a given 
country’s averages are used in the column (3) of Table 1.6. Using the firm-level 
deviations offers the additional advantage of controlling for respondents’ “propensity to 
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complain”. Since the objective ratings of these services should not differ much across 
firms within a specific country, actual differences in the ratings’ deviations from country 
means can be explained in part by differences among managers in their tendency to 
complain about all aspects of the business environment. In column (3), Lack of 
Infrastructure at the country level has a strong negative effect on firms’ performance. 
However, “propensity to complain” does not seem to be related to growth of sales.  
1.6.3 Labor Regulations 
Column (4) in Table 1.6 tests the robustness of the results with respect to obstacles in 
labor regulations. The index is given in the World Bank’s Development Indicators 
database but, in fact, it  is constructed from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The measure is 
calculated as a percentage of managers surveyed that rank labor regulation as a major 
business obstacle (Question 80k in questionnaire). The estimate in column (4) indicates 
that the more problematic are the labor regulations, the worse firms’ sales are. Again the 
coefficients of Regulatory Burden and its square, “grease” coefficient and Corruption 
separate estimate have the same signs, similar magnitudes and statistical significance as 
in column (1).  
 
1.6.4 Inflation 
We found in the data that inflation is positively correlated with individual firm growth of 
sales (9 percent correlation). The correlation coefficient between countries’ average 
growth of sales and inflation is 46 percent. First, the positive relationship may indicate 
that higher inflation is associated with higher economic activity and rising nominal 
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incomes of the population. Second, the positive relationship may also indicate that 
managers systematically overestimate the performance in real terms so that higher 
inflation is positively related to “overestimation”, which is in turn positively related to 
average growth of sales numbers. The measurement error in the dependent variable 
should not bias the coefficients unless it is correlated with a measurement error in 
independent variables. Therefore, it is important to check the sensitivity of results when 
the inflation term is included. Column (5) reports the results if the inflation is included in 
the model. Inflation is positively and significantly related to growth of sales; a 10 percent 
increase in inflation is associated with an increase of 4.4 percent in sales. The signs of the 
coefficient of the linear and non-linear terms related to Regulatory Burden and 
Corruption are the same. The size of the squared term is smaller but the “grease” 
coefficient is still significant at a 5 percent level.        
1.6.5 Political Freedom 
Because economic and political freedoms in countries may be related to each other, it is 
important to check the robustness of the results when the measurement of political 
freedom is added. In addition, the survey responses may be correlated with political 
freedoms as managers may be reluctant to reveal their perceptions about state institutions 
in authoritarian countries, fearing possible negative consequences of criticizing the 
government.  We draw measures of political freedom from Freedom House data. In 
particular, countries are categorized as free, partially free, and not free. In the regression, 
dummies for these categories are included (“not free” category is omitted), and results are 
reported in column (6). In addition, we use Legal Regulations Obstacles, Inflation and 
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GDP Growth as country controls. The latter two are especially important to control for 
because during 2000-2002 economic growth was on average higher in CIS region than 
CEB while the political freedom was worse in CIS. 
Column (6) shows that results related to Regulatory Burden and Corruption are 
robust to the inclusion of all country controls. Firms grow much faster in politically free 
countries than not free countries.  
In summary, the robustness tests show that some coefficients of country-level 
variables are very sensitive to the inclusion of relevant country-level controls. The 
concerns about omitted country level unobservables are important in our analysis. All 
firm-level estimates γ’s are very stable in all specifications and very similar to fixed 
effects “within” estimates in Table 1.5, column (2).  The robustness tests reinforce our 
major findings. The squared term of Regulatory Burden and its “grease” interaction with 
Corruption are most robust among the country-level coefficients. They always retain sign 
and are statistically significant in almost all specifications. 
Courts’ Quality and Obstacles in Financing country-level variables are not very 
robust in all specifications as signs and magnitudes of coefficients change dramatically 
across specifications. The effect country’s State Capture is negative except in column (5) 





Table 1.6 Sensitivity tests for Firms’ Growth of Sales Equation  
 
 Column (4) in Table 1.5 Adding country-level controls to check for 
robustness 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)   












   
Courts' Quality 7.94 2.07 7.7 2.17 10.33 1.95   
 [14.94] [1.15]* [11.67] [1.14]* [16.32] [1.22]    
Regulatory Burden 7.57 -0.23 9.74 -0.24 3.48 -0.23    
 [3.43]** [0.08]*** [4.05]** [0.08]*** [3.98] [0.08]***    
(Regulatory  -0.78  -1.08  -0.55     
     Burden)^2          [0.29]**  [0.37]***  [0.27]*     
Corruption -16.88 -0.70 -26.46 -0.68 -19.93 -0.73    
 [8.24]* [0.31]** [9.40]*** [0.31]** [8.96]** [0.31]**    
Reg. Burden X  3.04  4.23  3.66     
Corruption [1.07]***  [1.18]***  [1.26]***     
State Capture -16.16 4.50 -11.41 4.51 -9.48 4.64    
 [13.17] [1.95]** [11.01] [1.95]** [14.64] [2.00]**    
Obstacles -5.97 -2.03 1.98 -2.06 -5.3 -2.11    
           in Financing [8.66] [1.09]* [8.14] [1.08]* [8.56] [1.16]*    
GDP Growth Rates   2.07       
                  in 2000   [1.20]*       
Lack of 
Infrastructure   -21.82 -0.52  
 
   [10.98]* [2.93]   
      
      
Observations 3499 3499 3450   


















Robust-clustered standard errors in brackets, Sector controls and firm’s specific control from Table 1.5 
are included in all specifications. *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.6 (cont.) Sensitivity tests for Firms’ Growth of Sales Equation  
 
 Adding country-level controls to check for robustness 
Variables 























Courts' Quality 13.22 2.01 -1.65 2.03 8.23 2.17   
 [10.26] [1.15]* [13.69] [1.15]* [7.92] [1.15]*    
Regulatory Burden 9.5 -0.23 2.44 -0.23 9.52 -0.24    
 [3.43]** [0.08]*** [3.98] [0.08]*** [2.97]*** [0.08]***   
(Regulatory  -0.78  -0.41  -0.84     
       Burden)^2         [0.32]**  [0.35]  [0.32]**     
Corruption -17.31 -0.73 -15.5 -0.71 -14.86 -0.71    
 [9.71]* [0.31]** [8.43]* [0.31]** [10.75] [0.31]**    
Reg. Burden X  2.63  2.53  2.82     
Corruption [1.23]**  [1.09]**  [1.21]**     
State Capture -12 4.49 1.72 4.5 -11.87 4.5    
 [12.43] [1.95]** [12.25] [1.94]** [10.37] [1.96]**    
Obstacles 6.8 -2.15 -14.62 -2.09 3.95 -2.2    
           In 
Financing 
[6.71] [1.11]* [7.63]* [1.11]* [8.27] [1.10]* 
   
Labor Regulations  -1.23    -1.16     
Obstacles [0.24]***    [0.29]***    
Inflation   0.44  0.39    
   [0.19]**  [0.15]**    
Partially Free   12.39  
                 Country   [8.28]   
Free   Country   21.51  
       [6.16]***   
GDP Growth 2000   2.41  
   [0.69]***   
Observations 3499 3499 3499  
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08  
 Robust-clustered standard errors in brackets, Sector controls and firm’s specific control from Table 1.5 






1.6.6 Alternative Dependent Variable: Investment 
The model should be checked against alternative measure of performance of firms. We 
use the investment variable. The relevant survey question asks managers about the 
percentage change in fixed assets such as land, buildings, machinery and equipment. 
Results are reported on Table 1.7. Among firm-level perception variables in column (1), 
only Corruption and Obstacles in Financing are significant at 5 percent level with 
expected signs. In column (2), country-level estimates display similar coefficients to 
estimates in models for growth of sales. Note that non-linear terms are highly significant. 
Thus, the use of the alternative measure of firms’ performance leads to very similar 

























Table 1.7 Alternative dependent variable: Investment 
 
 Firm-level effects and 
country FE’s 
Non-Linear Model 
in Regulatory Burden and Corruption  








Courts' Quality 0.08 8.22 0.16  
 [1.16] [6.93] [1.15]  
Regulatory Burden 0.03 4.61 0.03  
 [0.05] [2.47]* [0.05]  
(Regulatory Burden) ^ 2  -0.62   
       [0.22]***   
Corruption -0.49 -19.58 -0.47  
 [0.19]** [5.36]*** [0.19]**  
Reg. Burden X  Corruption  2.9   
     [0.61]***   
State Capture 2.02 8.24 1.98  
  [1.33] [8.72] [1.34]  
Obstacles in Financing -1.98 -1.39 -1.94  
   [0.76]** [5.29] [0.76]**  
Inflation  0.17   
  [0.10]*   
Partially Free  6.65   
                 Country  [5.51]   
Free   Country  8.58   
      [5.08]*   
GDP Growth 2000  2.11   
  [0.62]***   
Firms' Age -0.15 -0.17 
 [0.05]** [0.05]*** 
Ln(Size) 1.83 1.94 
 [0.48]*** [0.49]*** 
State -6.65 -6.13 
  [2.52]** [2.57]** 
New Private 7.77 7.23 
 [2.71]*** [2.53]*** 
Lack of Market Power -1.09 -0.96 
               [0.73] [0.78] 
Constant 4.71 -17.84 
 [10.24] [23.05] 
Obs 3383 3383 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 
Robust-clustered standard errors in brackets, Sector controls are included in all specifications  





1.7 Concluding Remarks 
Decomposition of institutional survey measures for each firm into the average for their 
country and a residual firm-specific component used in this study is the nested version of 
the country fixed effects model. This procedure allows us to differentiate between cross-
country and firm-specific effects, and these effects are found to be strikingly different. 
The most significant findings of this chapter are the nonlinear effects of country-level 
corruption, regulatory burden on growth of sales for firms. The regulatory burden 
variable displays a Laffer-type relationship with respect to the performance of firms. The 
separate effect of corruption is negative. However, at high levels of regulatory burden, 
higher corruption in the country helps to improve the performance of firms. This implies 
that excessive liberalization of regulations should be treated with caution. However, 
excessively high levels of regulatory burden may encourage corruption in the country. 
We also find some indication in the data that state capture helps individual firms for a 
given country, yet such corruption has greater negative effects at the national level. 
Previous studies were able to identify firm-level positive effects, while country-level 
negative impacts were only suggested on a hypothetical basis. 
The major issue with our approach is that average country indices may be correlated 
with unobserved country variables that are important for the economic outcomes of firms. 
Our sensitivity tests with respect to measures of GDP growth, infrastructure, labor 
regulations, inflation and political freedom show that the coefficients of non-linear terms 
are quite robust to inclusion of the country level variables.  
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The broad range of questions in the BEEPS survey is very valuable, yet desired 
concepts are difficult to measure so that the questions in the questionnaire may not 
accurately reflect the information to meet objectives of such research. In this study, 
choosing questions for the institutional measures and corruption has been done in a 
somewhat ad hoc manner, and, perhaps, more analysis is required when assessing the 
potential subjectivity and minimizing the measurement errors. For this purpose, the two 
BEEPS data can be analyzed together to quantify specific sources of measurement errors 




Chapter 2: How economic shocks affect the incidence of politically 
destabilizing events: an instrumental variable approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the obvious impressions drawn from news headlines is that socio-political 
instability is sparked by worsening economic conditions. Indeed, the world has seen 
many episodes in which a country’s economic turmoil was accompanied by radical 
political changes. For instance, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 in Thailand, Korea, 
Indonesia and Malaysia was followed by political unrest and discontent in these 
countries. In Thailand and Korea, democratic elections were held and the opposition 
came to power. In Indonesia, Suharto’s long dictatorship ended when riots and 
demonstrations finally forced him to resign. Malaysia has also faced a significant rise in 
political activism. South America provides another recent example of this phenomenon: 
Argentina’s leaders resigned under increasing political pressure following the rapid 
deterioration of economic conditions during the crisis in 2001-2002.  
However, there are also many episodes when destabilization has occurred during 
economically good times. Following the painful transition in the 1990s, most of the 
former Soviet Union countries during the early years of the new century were enjoying 
high growth rates. Yet in some countries serious political events took place when living 
standards seem to be improving at a fast pace. Ukraine’s "Orange Revolution" was a 
series of mass protests that took place throughout the country in response to allegations of 




Ukrainian presidential election. Notably, growth in Ukraine was a strong 9.3 percent 
(10.22 percent in per capita terms) in 2003 and a remarkable 12 percent (13 percent per 
capita) in 2004. One year earlier, the end of 2003, Georgia’s “unfair” parliamentary 
elections also sparked massive anti-governmental demonstrations which led to the so 
called “Rose Revolution” and a change of presidential power with new elections in 
January 2004. Interestingly, growth rates in 2002 and 2003 were 5.5 percent (6.63 
percent per capita) and 11.1 percent (12.3 percent per capita) respectively. In Kazakhstan 
during the period  of booming resource based economy, 2005 and 2006 seem to see the 
rise not only of the peaceful political activism of the opposition but also of several 
assassinations of key political figures which rumors attributed to the political struggle 
among the elites. These examples show that political mobilization against existing 
regimes starts during the time of high contemporaneous growth rates.   
Studying the relationship between economic conditions and political instability has 
attracted the attention of many researchers. This study is an empirical contribution to 
understanding the related question: to what extent can the incidence of politically 
destabilizing events be explained as a result of economic shocks?  
The importance of the question is related to the determination of the political stability 
that is commonly seen as one of the major determinants of economic growth (Gupta 
1990, Barro 1991, Roubini 1991, Fosu 1992). In general, political stability is perceived to 
be a longer term phenomenon that does not vary much in the short run. In a secure 
political environment, one observes very few destabilizing political events, such as 
peaceful and violent protests of the masses, revolutions, political assassinations, military 
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coups, and civil wars. Researchers would generally characterize such a state as a long run 
equilibrium. However, as with any equilibrium, political equilibrium may be affected by 
shocks in the short run. In particular, economic shocks may disturb the equilibrium 
resulting in short term disequilibrium or instability, which can be manifested in the above 
mentioned destabilizing events. However, short term instability or uncertainty in turn 
affects economic growth making it harder to use statistical analysis to predict to what 
extent and in which direction economic shocks are affecting political instability.  This is a 
standard joint endogeneity or two-way causation problem in the econometric analysis.     
In my opinion, this problem of endogeneity has not been satisfactorily addressed in 
existing empirical literature studying the relationship between economic shocks and 
political instability variables. As a result, there is no agreement in economic and political 
science literature as to whether economic conditions matter for political destabilization17. 
We believe that such disagreement mainly comes from weaknesses in the methodologies 
used, from different definitions applied to instability, and differences across 
specifications. Methodological weaknesses are due to the failure to address the 
endogeneity between these two variables: studies either do not account for endogeneity at 
all or use inadequate instruments in the form of lagged endogenous variables, which is 
inappropriate if variables under consideration are autocorrelated (Green 2000, Mauro 
1995, Brunetti 1997, Miguel et al 2004, Angrist and Krueger 2001). In addition, if the 
causal link between economic conditions and instability is found in some studies, then 
lower economic growth rates would increase the incidence of destabilizing events (coups 
in Lodgregan and Poole 1990, civil conflicts in Miguel et al. 2004). In contrast, the data 
                                                 
17 Examples include Lodgregan and Poole (1990), Alesina et al. (1996), Gasiorowski (1998). The next 
section discusses the evidence in more detail. 
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and analysis in this study shows that the political unrest is more likely to happen during 
higher contemporaneous income per capita growth rates.  
We use the instrumental variable approach to study the effects of income changes on 
the probability of politically destabilizing events. The identification strategy in this study 
allows for focusing on short-term economic fluctuations that “trigger” political events, 
but it does not intend to explain the duration in political cycles. We use exogenous 
variation in world primary commodity prices as instrumental variables for 
contemporaneous GDP growth. It is argued that fluctuations in the world primary 
commodity prices play an important role for economic fluctuations around the world. In 
particular, oil price is an arguably plausible instrument for GDP growth in economies that 
largely rely on oil imports. The approach is similar to the strategy in Miguel et al. (2004) 
who use changes in rainfall as an instrument for income growth variation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to study the incidence of civil wars. This study covers a greater number of 
countries and a longer time period. We also use the larger set of political variables that 
allows investigating whether economic shocks affect in a different way various political 
events. 
In the next section, we will review the existing literature that is most relevant to the 
question studied. In section 2.3, there is a discussion about the empirical strategies of 
how we are going to deal with the endogeneity problem. Section 2.4 describes the data 
sources and variables. Section 2.5 explains the choice of the instrument while section 2.6 
presents the results and robustness checks. The comparison to Miguel et al. (2004) study 
is made in section 2.7 followed by concluding remarks in section 2.8.   
 
  46
2.2 Some Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence  
This section examines the main theoretical views and reviews relevant empirical 
studies about the relationship between economic growth and political instability. We have 
found several alternative explanations and disagreements both in theory and empirical 
evidence. 
Theoretical considerations are mainly dominated by the literature that provides 
arguments showing that a lower economic growth can increase the probability of a 
change in government, political unrest, and violence (Brunetti 1997). Rapid and sustained 
growth increases the popularity of the government, thus reducing the probability that the 
existing government is thrown out by regular or irregular transfers. Lower growth has 
similar destabilizing effects on all types of government changes, perhaps with different 
intensities. The existing government is either punished or rewarded according to its 
economic performance. For instance, Drazen (2000) summarizes that several studies find 
that pre-election economic conditions are directly related to election outcomes and the 
popularity of incumbent politicians in the US and other OECD countries with established 
democracies. Brender and Drazen (2006) find that higher growth rates raise the 
probability of reelection in less developed countries and in new democracies. 
Gasiorowski (1998) sums up the idea in the literature that adverse economic conditions 
generate widespread frustration, increasing support for opposition movements.  
An alternative view is that instability may occur during good times in the economy. 
This view is rarely referenced in the literature. The idea of “revolutions of rising 
expectations” initially attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville suggests that anti-government 
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protests and unrest occur when people begin to expect more, owing to improvements in 
their lives. Olson (1963) also supported the idea that economic growth stimulates “rising 
expectations” about what the government should do and it “can awaken people to the 
possibilities of further improvement and thereby generate additional discontent” (p. 542).  
Olson goes further and considers the sociological roots of protests concluding that “a 
rapid economic growth is a major force leading toward revolution and instability.” Olson 
argues that people, who participate in revolutionary mass movements, tend to lack close 
attachments to social subgroups (“extended families”, professional groups, or social 
classes). To Olson, “it is not those who are accustomed to poverty, but those whose place 
in the society is changing, who resort to revolution (p.531).”  During rapid economic 
growth, there are vast changes in the methods of production, importance of industries, 
distribution of income, so that some people gain a great deal and others lose a great 
deal.18 Both gainers and losers from rapid growth can be destabilizing forces. Gainers can 
use their increased economic power to change political order in their interest while losers 
are resentful of their newly decreased position in society.  
Huntington (1968) is concerned that, as a result of economic development, political 
mobilization will increase faster than the appropriate institutions can arise, thus leading to 
instability. Huntington suggested that social instability was due precisely because growth 
and industrialization put pressure on existing institutions. Conflict was a result of the 
inability of institutions to adjust, which required strong political institutions to promote 
stability. 
                                                 
18 Many peoples’ previous ties with class and caste are weakened because their income brackets are 
changed and this may keep them from belonging to the group (class) in which they were born. Rapid 
industrialization and modern business institutions may also break traditional social family groupings 
(tribes, guilds, rural villages) that existed before rapid economic changes took place. 
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Overall, the empirical evidence disagrees as to whether changes in economic growth 
are important at all for political instability. If the relationship is found significant, studys 
suggest that lower growth increases instability. However, Campus and Nugent (2002) 
find that if the measure of institutional development is controlled for, the effect of growth 
on their measure of socio-political instability becomes positive in Latin America. They 
do not pay much attention to this result leaving investigation for “future work”.  
The empirical literature can be broadly divided into studys looking at the long run 
relationship between growth and political instability and articles that estimate the short 
run dynamics of the annual frequency data. The “short run” studys have more relevance 
to our research agenda of identifying the effects of economic conditions on political 
changes, and; therefore, we will focus more on these studies below.  
The majority of studys addressing joint endogeneity between growth and political 
instability use the instrumental variable approach in estimating the relationship. 
Typically, authors employ earlier values of the endogenous variables (instability 
measures and growth rates) as instruments, but the validity of such instruments is 
questionable if the variables under consideration are autocorrelated.19  More specifically, 
Miguel et al. (2004) argue in the case of civil wars that using lagged GDP growth values 
implicitly assumes that economic actors in previous periods did not anticipate the 
instability and that they did not adjust economic activity accordingly, which is a very 
                                                 
19 Green (2000, p.689, 701) notes that using lagged endogenous instruments results in misspecification if 
disturbances are autocorrelated.   
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strong assumption, and lagging economic variables may not be a convincing solution to 
the endogeneity problem. 
Cukierman et al. (1992) recognize that political instability is affected by economy in 
the short run and estimate the equation for probability of changes in government as a 
function of inflation and consumption’s share of GDP using annual panel data in 79 
countries. However, they do not account for feedback effects from changes in 
government on the economy in the short run. They find weak evidence that higher 
inflation and lower growth of private consumption make government changes more likely 
to happen.  
Lodgregan and Poole (1990) also argue that if an economic crisis occurs or economic 
growth turns into stagnation or decline, then a change in executive is more likely to 
emerge. Their major objective is to study the short run relationship between economic 
performance and political instability in the form of coups d’etat – the irregular transfer of 
executive power. They first construct the autoregressive probit model of coups with 
economic performance and regional variables and find negative insignificant effect of last 
period growth on the incidence of coups in the data with annual frequency. The authors 
further address the issue of joint endogeneity by estimating a system of two equations. 
Similarly, Alesina et al. (1992, 1996) use a simultaneous equations framework with a 
somewhat different model specification including broader definition of government 
changes and updated determinants of growth. Their study defines political instability as 
“the propensity of a change in the executive either by constitutional and unconstitutional 
means”. Acknowledging endogeneity in instability and economic performance, both 
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studys suggest simultaneous equation method at annual frequency in the following form 
(from Alesina et al. 1996): 
c* = αcXc + βcX + γcy + u1      (2.1) 
y  = αyXy + βyX + γyc* + u2      (2.2) 
where  c* is an indicator of a government change,  y is an annual rate of income growth, X 
are exogenous variables that determine both c* and y, Xc are instruments for instability, and 
Xy are instruments for growth. The identification of this system requires that at least one of 
each of the Xc and Xy variables exist so that the exogenous variable(s) in the growth 
equation does not belong to the equation for instability and vice-versa. Both Londregan and 
Poole (1990) and Alesina et al. (1992) use earlier values of variables as instruments, Xy = 
yt-1 and Xc = c*t-1.  However, it is questionable that yt-1 does not belong to (2.1) and c*t-1 is 
not in (2.2). In other words, there is no reason to believe that current occurrence of the 
change in executive is independent of past economic performance, and even more 
questionable is the assumption that current economic performance is not affected by past 
instabilities. In addition, Alesina et al. (1992, 1996) use education as an instrument for 
growth and the occurrence of an executive adjustment in previous period as an instrument 
for the government change. These two instruments may also not be valid as education is 
likely to be correlated with changes in executives and lagged executive adjustment may be 
the part of lagged government change that is already being used as an instrument. Alesina 
et al. (1992) found that economic performance does not significantly influence changes in 
government. In contrast, Lodgregan and Poole (1990) found that lower growth increases 
the incidence of the coups. Thus, these two studies, while using a very similar methodology 
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and datasets, reach different conclusions about whether the variation in economic growth 
rates matters in determining the likelihood of government changes. Alesina et al. (1996) 
claim that such disagreement comes from differences in defining government changes and 
growth equation specifications. However, we think, in addition to these differences, both 
studies fail to reach agreement due to the use of bad instruments.  
Some of the more recent attempts in the literature employ Granger causality tests to 
investigate relationships between instability and growth. However, Granger tests may be 
uninformative if these two variables are affected by a third, unless the latter is controlled 
for. In cross-country data the possibility of omitted variables is very high; hence the 
usefulness of the Granger test may be limited. Gasiorowski (1998) uses Granger causality 
tests in annual frequency data and concludes that the incidence of unstable events has more 
of an effect on economic growth than the latter do on the former. Campos and Nugent 
(2002) constructed two indexes of socio-political instability (SPI) for non-overlapping 5-
year periods, between 1960 and 1995, for 98 developing countries. In general, they found 
no evidence of the causal long run relationship between political instability and economic 
growth in either direction. In addition, accounting for institutional development measured 
by legislative effectiveness makes growth effect on SPI in Latin America positive. This 
positive effect of growth on instability is consistent with theories of Olson (1963) and 
Huntington (1968) but authors do not make a connection to such interpretation and leave 
explanations for future work.  
One study deserves more careful attention since it uses an interesting choice of 
instrument for economic shocks that distinguishes this study from others reviewed here. 
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Miguel et al. (2004) studied the effects of economic shocks on the likelihood of civil 
conflict. The sample included 41 African countries during 1981-99. They use exogenous 
variation in rainfall as an instrument for income growth in order to estimate the impact of 
economic growth on the civil conflict. Authors argue that these weather shocks make a 
good case for the instrument for GDP growth in countries that largely rely on rain fed 
agriculture, such as sub-Saharan Africa, but this identification strategy is inappropriate for 
other regions in the world. Also their dependent variable is the incidence of civil wars, 
which is the most horrible type of instability, and their study does not examine how 
economic shocks affect other types of the political events, such as mass protests, 
demonstrations, and riots against existing governments and regimes. They find a strong 
negative causal effect of GDP growth on the incidence of civil wars. In our study, we use 
the similar approach of using instruments for economic fluctuations, but our choice of the 
instrument allows studying a larger set of countries, and we also examine a more broad set 
of political unstable events.  
In sum, we find that the alternative theories suggest that there may be positive and 
negative effects of growth on politically unstable events in the short run. Furthermore, the 
empirical literature is not able to reach an agreement as to whether economic shocks are 
important for the incidence of politically unstable events. We believe that a major weakness 
of the existing literature is a failure to address the endogeneity between these two variables: 
studies either do not account for endogeneity at all or use bad instruments in the form of 
lagged endogenous variables. The use of problematic instruments causes the instrumental 
variable approach to fail to serve its purpose in correcting biases coming from the joint 
endogeneity. The relevant empirical evidence is summarized in Table 2.1.  
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If one believes that political uncertainty negatively effects growth as it is consistently 
documented in the literature20 then the standard OLS or Probit estimation of the effects of 
economic growth changes on instability will result in downward biased estimates. Because 
IV method with problematic instruments results in inconsistent estimator, the estimates are 
certainly not reliable. Miguel et al. (2004) seems to use a valid instrument but the sample is 
limited only to a subset of African countries. Also civil wars as a measure for political 
conflict may not capture variation in other more moderate types of politically unstable 
events such as mass protests, coups and revolutions. Thus, we are convinced that further 
work is needed covering other regions of the world and using alternative sets of dependent 


























                                                 
20 see the summary of the literature in Persson and Tabellini (1999). 
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Table 2.1 Existing studies about effects of economic conditions on political instability 
variables. 
Study Data and Political Instability Measure 
Countries 
and period Specification and Method Result 
 
Cukierman 
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21 SPI – Socio-Political Instability 
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2.3 Estimation Strategy 
In this study, the major focus is placed on finding whether short-term economic 
fluctuations trigger political events that may disrupt overall stability. These events are 
discrete and may signal the imminence of a political crisis. The dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if the event is observed, should measure the underlying propensity 
of the occurrence of such an event. The estimated equations follow models typically used 
in the reviewed literature (Alesina et al. 1996, Lodgregan and Poole 1990, Gasiorowski 
1998, Miguel et al. 2004). It describes the probability of the occurrence of destabilizing 
political events as a function of economic and political variables: 
Y it = α + β X it + C γ + εit       (2.3) 
where   i = country index, t = time index 
Yit = incidence of political destabilizing event (1 if destabilizing event was 
observed, 0 if otherwise)  
Xit = measure of economic shocks (growth of GDP per capita) 
C = is vector of controls which are important for political environment 
The equation (2.3) may not be correctly estimated if Xit is also affected by Yit, and 
OLSβ̂  or PROBITβ̂  are biased downwards if the short-term political instability negatively 
affects growth. The identification strategy is to find the instrument Zit that affects the 
incidence of instability only through changes in economic growth. If such an instrument 
is found, then equation (2.3) can be estimated by the instrumental variable method, where 
the first stage is: 
Xit =a  + bZit + Cit c + eit      (2.4) 
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In this study we use exogenous variation in oil prices as an instrumental variable for 
economic shocks. Oil shocks arguably have significant impacts on GDP growth in all 
countries. While oil exporters clearly benefit from the direct impact of higher oil prices, 
lower domestic demand and substantial second round effects cause the overall activity to 
decline in oil importing countries (see IMF 2000 for a detailed analysis). Various 
economic channels include the impacts of oil prices on the cost of production of goods 
and services, domestic aggregate demand, inflation, corporate earnings, etc. As the oil 
intensity of production in advanced countries has fallen over the past three decades, the 
supply side impact for a given increase in oil prices can be expected to have been less in 
recent years than in the past episodes of oil shocks taking place in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
followed by the global economic slumps (IMF 2000). Overall, the empirical evidence is 
focused on OECD countries and it shows that oil shocks have been important for 
economic activity in recent years as well (Mork and Olson 1994, Lee and Ratti 1995, 
Hamilton 1996, Ferderer 1996, Davis and Haltwinger 2001). 
If the effects of oil price fluctuations on economic conditions do exist, the remaining 
question is whether oil shocks are plausible instruments in our setting. The key issue in 
justifying the validity of oil price fluctuations being an instrument is that oil shocks 
should affect political environment only through economic channels. However, political 
variables in oil exporting countries are potentially linked to changes in oil prices through 
other channels. Political science literature points to several possible effects of oil wealth 
on political stability and the democratization process in oil rich countries (Smith 2004, 
Ross 2001). The government can use oil wealth on patronage spending to reduce social 
pressures for political changes. The repression of opposition forces may occur since the 
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government has extra resources from oil wealth to spend on military forces supporting 
the existing powers. Finally, the mere existence of oil wealth, accessible through 
possession of the executive power, creates additional incentives to seek oil rents in the 
society so that political tension arises between incumbent and other potentially powerful 
forces in the country. So, the argument that oil prices affect political instability only 
through economic channels is much weaker in oil exporting countries. Therefore, our 
identification strategy may be inappropriate for oil exporting countries.  
In contrast, oil importers do not depend on oil wealth eliminating those potential 
effects of oil prices on politics. We think that world oil prices are truly exogenous to a 
small oil importing country in the sense that its economy and internal, as well as external, 
politics do not affect world markets for oil.  Furthermore, we do not see possibilities 
where changes in oil prices might directly affect political instability independently of 
changes in measures of income in an oil importing country. For instance, one could 
possibly argue that higher oil prices are associated with higher gasoline prices and this 
may add more anger and frustration to the public; however, we think that this kind of 
discontent is not independent of income changes since dissatisfaction arises from the 
perception of people that higher gas prices result in a decrease in real incomes. Therefore, 
such unhappiness is effectively linked to changes in real incomes.  
In sum, the identification strategy leaves us with a sample consisting of countries that 
are oil importers and not big enough to affect world oil markets. On this ground we 
exclude from the sample: major industrialized countries -- US, Germany and Japan, oil 
 
  58
producers22, developing China and India, and countries from the former communist 
block23.  
2.4 Variables and Data 
Sanders (1981) proposes a breakdown of political changes into four indicator events 
that destabilize political stability: regime changes (changes in party system, in military-
civilian status), government changes (changes in chief executive, in cabinet), violent 
events (guerrilla attacks, riots, deaths from political violence, attempted coups), peaceful 
events (strikes, demonstrations). Such categorization in our view will help to identify 
whether economic changes may affect differently the occurrence of various political 
events. Gasiorowski (1998) uses a very similar classification but narrows it to the 
available data which is Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive in 1996 (Banks-
CNTS). This study utilizes updated Banks-CNTS (2000) data for political events, so we 
will follow Gasiorowski’s classification: unrest, violent unrest, government changes and 
political assassinations. More specifically, the first category is a measure of the extent of 
unrest, which is a combination of demonstrations, general strikes, and riots. The second is 
a measure of violent unrest, which brings together guerrilla warfare and revolutionary 
activity. The third category includes changes in government such as successful coups 
d’etat, changes in effective executive and cabinets. The data also provides the measure of 
government crises which excludes revolutions but covers the occurrence of any other 
                                                 
22 We exclude oil exporters on the basis of oil production. The sample contains countries that do not 
produce oil at all or produce very little relative to oil consumption and GDP.  
23 The former Soviet Union countries’ sample is limited only to post-1990 period. Prior to collapse, the 
politics and economy were related in a very special way among countries in the socialist block, and oil 
prices were heavily subsidized by the Soviet Union in intra-group trade. However, one can argue that the 
collapse of the system occurred mainly due to poor economic performance.  
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“rapidly developing situations that threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime” 
(Appendix 2.1). In fact, it is not clear exactly from the data which situations are 
considered so we do not assign a specific category to this measure. We also separately 
consider the incidence of political assassinations. Appendix 2.1  contains definitions of 
the political event variables in Banks-CNTS dataset.24 The time period is chosen from 
1960 to 1999 due to data availability and also because many developing countries gained 
independence during the 1950s.     
The most widely used economic data are Penn’s World Tables (Heston et al. 2002), 
where data is adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity. We obtain the real 
GDP per capita figures from this data. Oil prices are given in BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy June 2004. 
The exclusion of big countries and oil producers leaves the sample consisting of 67 
countries during the period 1960-1999. The panel is unbalanced as some observations are 
missing. Summary statistics are given in Table 2.2. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Although the original data provides the frequency of events, we convert these frequencies into dummy 
variables to evaluate the probability of the occurrence of events. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP Growth per capita        2600 0.012 0.068 -0.72 0.437 
Real GDP per capita 2669 4640 5533 281 41383 
      
∆ + Ln(Poil) 2680 0.087 0.214 0 1.154 
∆ - Ln(Poil) 2680 -0.076 0.126 -0.67 0 
[∆ + Ln (Poil)] 2 2680 0.053 0.218 0 1.33 
      
Political Events Dummies:      
 Unrest 2468 0.276 0.447 0 1 
General Strikes 2468 0.084 0.277 0 1 
AntiGov. Demonstrations 2469 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Riots 2468 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Violent Unrest 2465 0.249 0.427 0 1 
Guerrilla Warfare 2465 0.153 0.360 0 1 
Revolutions 2468 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Government Changes      
Successful Coups 2503 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Change in Executive 2503 0.161 0.367 0 1 
Cabinet Changes 2490 0.416 0.493 0 1 
Other:      
Government Crises 2468 0.12 0.325 0 1 
Assassinations 2468 0.102 0.303 0 1 
      
Democracy  2347 0.377 0.485 0 1 
Anocracy  2347 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Autocracy 2347 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2680 0.470 0.266 0 0.93 
Military Regime 2503 0.161 0.368 0 1 
Urbanization, % of population 2680 0.371 0.238 0.022 0.97 
Legislative Effectiveness 2503 1.675 1.041 0 3 
Party Coalitions 2498 1.567 1.291 0 3 
Rival Party Legitimacy 2498 0.495 0.500 0 1 
Log of Real GDP per capita, MA(5) 2612 7.846 1.025 5.73 10.49 
Purges, MA(2) 2403 0.116 0.415 0 5 




Miguel et al. (2004) studying the incidence of civil conflicts use controls for a 
country’s political and social characteristics which are drawn from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). Both studies include measures of ethnic or religious diversity on grounds that 
these measures may be associated with political instability. Miguel et al. (2004) find that 
higher ethnic fractionalization increases the probability of conflict but their coefficient is 
not statistically significant. We use measures of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et 
al.(2003)25. The index reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
from a population belonged to different ethnic groups. 
Democracy measures are drawn from Polity IV Project (2002). The original polity 
scores range is from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). It is very common in 
empirical literature to use the index scores as a continuous variable in regressions. 
However, political processes are likely to be different in autocratic countries and 
democratic countries. Therefore, a democratic change in index from -5 to -4 is likely to 
have different implications on political instability as compared to the impact of a 
democratic change from 4 to 5. In our view, it is more appropriate to use Polity IV scores 
to categorize regimes into democratic, autocratic, and “in-between” regimes dummies 
like in Gurr and Marshall (2003). “Anocracies” are regimes where countries are “in-
between” (Polity scores range from -5 to +5) and have a mix of democratic and autocratic 
features. 
                                                 
25 Data is posted by Wacziarg at http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/ 
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Auvinen (1997) also implements controls for urbanization because political demands 
are typically higher in urban areas and political mobilization is easier simply because of 
higher population concentration; therefore, highly urbanized countries are likely to 
experience more protest than less urbanized countries.  
Banks-CNTS data provides other variables that characterize political institutions. We 
use these variables in the way that other scholars studying political instability have done.  
Campos and Nugent (2002) argue and show that institutional development should be 
negatively correlated with the level of socio-political instability (SPI). They use the index 
of legislative effectiveness from Banks-CNTS dataset (1984) as a measure of institutional 
development.   
Feng (1997) estimates logit equation where the dependent variable is the probability 
of government change as a function of economic and political variables. The latter set 
includes variables from Banks-CNTS that describe political systems of countries in terms 
of regime type (civilian or military), election processes (rival party legitimacy, party 
coalitions). These variables are described in Appendix 2.1.  
Political institution variables (measures of democracy, regime type and nature of 
elections) are possibly endogenous as they can be affected by the political events under 
consideration. For instance, in a politically unstable environment, ruling authorities may 
respond to political destabilization by initiating political reforms that would alter the 
political process in the country toward a more democratic or authoritarian government so 
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that the democracy measure would change.  To reduce such a possibility of endogeneity, 
we use lagged values of political variables that characterize political institutions.26  
2.5 Oil Shocks and GDP Growth in the First Stage: Choosing Instruments 
The effects of oil price shocks on growth and economic activity have been 
empirically documented relatively well for the US economy and selected OECD 
countries.  
Early empirical studies generally regressed GDP on oil prices and found that oil 
shocks negatively affect economic activity and were an important cause of recessions in 
the 1970s and early 1980s (Hamilton 1983, Burbidge and Harrison 1984, Gisser and 
Goodwin 1986).  
Since the early 1980s, however, oil prices began to fall, which historically had rarely 
happened and the estimated relationship between growth and oil prices became less 
significant. Mork (1989) suggested testing for asymmetric effects of oil price increases 
and decreases. The motivation is that any oil price movement creates costly reallocation 
of resources but in the case of oil price increase such costly reallocation work in the same 
direction with harmful supply-side effects of oil price increases on growth. However, 
frictions associated with negative changes in oil prices make the benefits of an oil price 
                                                 
26 However, this approach does not guarantee that the issue of endogeneity is resolved because 
political discontent may still be present in the previous period, but did not materialize in the form of actual 
destabilization events, so that present events may be correlated with past changes in political variables that 
describe a political system. Therefore, the coefficients of lagged political variables may be biased and 




decline smaller.  Mork’s study found that the real effects of oil price increases are 
different from oil price decreases, and the latter do not have a statistically significant 
impact on US economic activity. These issues were further explored by other authors 
from various angles, and they found that oil prices have asymmetric effects on output, 
inflation, employment, and wages (Mork and Olsen 1994, Lee and Ratti 1995, Hamilton 
1996, Ferderer 1996, Davis and Haltwinger 2001).  
Here, we use three different forms for oil price shocks that are typically used in the 
literature and can be potentially applied as instruments in IV method. Table 2.3 presents 
the first-stage relationship between oil shocks and income growth. All columns include 
country fixed effects, which permits one to account for unobservable country-specific 
time invariant characteristics that are important for growth and reducing the possibility of 
an omitted variable bias.  Furthermore, we use country specific time trends along with 
country fixed effects to capture additional time variation. Finally, political controls are 
included because these are used in the main equation of IV estimation. 
It is found in the data that lagged percentage changes in oil prices have biggest and 
most precise estimated negative effects on GDP growth rates. In column (1), the oil shock 
variable is a simple percentage change in oil prices or 
211 )()()( −−− −=Δ ttt PoilLnPoilLnPoilLn . The coefficient is negative and significant at 
the ten-percent level. F test of excluded instruments is rather low, 2.87 (p-value=0.09), 
suggesting that the instrument is weak.  
Column (2) in Table 2.3 distinguishes between positive and negative changes, as in 
Mork (1989) , which are defined as 1)( −




−Δ tPoilLn for negative values of 1)( −Δ tPoilLn .
27 Note that both positive and 
negative oil price growth rates have different signs, and the effect of positive shocks is 
about two times greater in magnitude than in column (1). F statistics shows a higher joint 
significance of instruments but is still relatively low.  
In addition, column (3) adds a dummy for the positive changes in oil prices allowing 
different intercepts for our two types of shocks. Omitting this dummy would “force” 
regression lines for positive and negative oil shocks to have a common intercept, which 
will in turn, bias both slope coefficients if the intercepts are different. The coefficient on 
negative percentage changes in oil prices is close to zero, suggesting that the harmful 
effects of oil price declines due to frictions arising from the economy’s adjustment are 
about the same as benefits due to lower oil prices.28 The dummy for the positive oil shock 
appears positive and significant. The slope coefficient for positive percentage changes in  
(3) is now larger in absolute value than in (2). Consequently, the F statistics show slightly 
better correlation of excluded instruments with the endogenous income growth. Looking 
forward to IV-2SLS results, one also needs to consider the overidenticiaftion test in the 
IV model. However, the reported overidentification test is very close to rejection of the 
joint null hypothesis of instruments validity at the ten-percent level.  
 
 
                                                 
27 Zeros are absent in the data. 
28 This is similar to conclusions reached in Mork and Olsen (1994) and Jimenez-Rodrıguez and  Sanchez 
(2005) who find, for some OECD countries that oil price increases have a greater impact on real GDP 
growth than that of oil price declines, with the latter being insignificant in most cases. 
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Table 2.3 Choosing Instruments for IV method: First Stage Regressions 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Δ Ln(P oil)t-1 -0.008     
 [0.005]*     
Δ+ Ln(P oil)t-1  -0.018 -0.026   
  [0.007]*** [0.008]***   
Δ- Ln(P oil)t-1  0.013 0.0007   
  [0.011] [0.011]   
Dummy for    0.009   
            Δ+ Ln(P oil) t-1   [0.004]**   
Δ+ Ln(P oil)t-1
2    -0.018  
    [0.006)***  
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Trend*Country  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Political Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 2223 2181 2181 2223  
Partial R-squared 0.0014 0.0038 0.0061 0.0042  
F test 2.87 3.83 3.97 8.08  
p-value (0.0903) (0.0219) (0.0079) (0.0045)  
Overid  test, χ 2 -- 0.78 4.48 --  
p-value -- (0.38) (0.11) --  
Robust clustered  standard errors in brackets. F test is test of joint significance of excluded instruments
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Our main interest, however, is not in testing the relationship between oil prices and 
growth. Although the model in column (3) appears to describe the relationship between 
oil shocks and income growth reasonably well, the first stage functional form does not 
have to be right in order to get consistent estimates in the second stage (Angrist and 
Krueger 2001). It is more important to find out which functional form of oil prices 
provides better instruments for our model. Asymmetric effects of oil prices on growth 
may suggest that the quadratic term for positive oil price growth rates may be relevant for 
estimating the effects of oil shocks on GDP growth rates. Intuitively, negative effects of 
positive oil price shocks can be higher when these shocks are larger. Column (4) shows 
that 2 1)( −
+Δ tPoilLn  is indeed correlated with income growth with the expected negative 
sign. F statistics is 8.08, which is more than two times bigger than the statistics in (3). 
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Angrist and Krueger (2001) suggest that the bias of IV-2SLS estimates is proportional to 
the degree of overidentification if instruments are weak, and the use of fewer instruments 
reduces bias. Hence, our preferred candidate for an excluded instrument is the one in 
column (4).  
To summarize, there is evidence of an asymmetry in oil price effects with respect to 
GDP per capita growth. In comparison to the case when symmetry is assumed, allowing 
for asymmetry in first stage regressions provides a better choice of instruments for the IV 
model because correlations are stronger and more statistically significant.  
2.6 Main Empirical Results 
The major focus is on finding whether economic shocks have an effect on the 
incidence of politically destabilizing events. As it was argued in section 2.3, this task is 
complicated by feedback effects from political instability to economic conditions. We 
have also argued that feedback is most likely to be negative as it is consistently 
documented by a very large volume of the empirical literature. If one does not take into 
account the endogeneity in the growth rates in simple OLS or Probit regressions, the 
estimated growth coefficient β in equation (2.3) is biased downwards.  
In this section, we present our main estimated impacts of economic shocks on the 
incidence of various events. One of the key tasks is to assess whether the bias in OLS and 
Probit specifications is present, and whether the instrumental variable approach (IV) is 
able to correct the endogeneity bias. If the above proposition is true then the OLS and 
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Probit estimated coefficient should be smaller than the IV coefficient, 
PROBITIVSLSIVPROBITOLS −−< |2| ββ . 
2.6.1 Unrest 
In Table 2.4, columns (1) through (3) show OLS and Probit estimated effects of per 
capita income growth rates on the incidence of Unrest which is measured as a 
combination of indicators for General Strikes, Anti Government Demonstrations, and 
Riots. Columns (1) and (2) do not include country dummies while column (3) includes 
country fixed effects to capture time invariant country characteristics that may be related 
to political events under consideration.   
The first thing to note is that the OLS and Probit regression coefficients in (1)-(3) 
display a negative relationship between growth rates and the probability of the occurrence 
of Unrest. The size of the estimated impact of economic growth on Unrest in (3) indicates 
that a one-percentage-point decrease in the contemporaneous growth rate increases the 
likelihood of Unrest by 0.50 percentage points.  
These results differ dramatically if the endogeneity is taken into account in IV 
regressions in columns (4)-(7), Table 2.4. Columns (4) and (5) show coefficient of IV-
Probit estimation while columns (6) and (7) display IV-2SLS results. The IV coefficients 
of Growtht term in all of these columns are similar. It is striking that we find that the 
signs of coefficients in IV columns are positive. Therefore, in contrast to most of the 
existing empirical evidence, it is not the deterioration but the improvement in economic 
conditions that increases the likelihood of unrest, further supporting the idea of “rising 
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expectations”. The correction of the endogeneity seems to be consistent with the fact that 
PROBITIVSLSIVPROBITOLS −−< |2| ββ  if there is a negative feedback effect from Unrest to 
Growth. The size of the estimated impact of economic growth is quite large: significant 
marginal effect in column (4) implies that one-percentage-point rise in GDP per capita 
increases the likelihood of the Unrest by 3.41 percentage points. Therefore, if GDP goes 
up by seven-percentage-point, which is about one standard deviation in annual per capita 
income growth (Table 2.2), then the probability of Unrest will increase by about 24- 
percentage-point. This increase is nearly equal to the average incidence of Unrest in the 
data (Table 2.2). 
Regressions in Table 2.5 estimate the impact of Growth on Unrest by region. The 
impacts are still positive in all regions except Europe and South East Asia. However, the 
estimated positive effects of Growth are significant in Latin America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and South East Asia. Shown results are estimated by the IV-Probit regressions. 
The IV-2SLS estimates of growth effects are similar in magnitudes and the signs of 
coefficients, but significance levels are lower (Table A2.3 in the Appendix 2.1). In 
addition, the oil shock instrument in IV-2SLS regressions is very weak in all regional 
regressions except for Western Europe, as shown by the F tests in Table A2.3 in the 
Appendix 2.1. Thus, the evidence is not completely convincing, but suggestive about 
some of the hypotheses. In particular, the interpretation of differences in the signs of 
coefficients across regions may be consistent with the views of Olson (1963) and 
Huntington (1968) as outlined in section 2. Huntington argued that economic 
development puts pressure on existing institutions and that  
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Table 2.4 Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Unrest 
  Unrest  
















Growth t -0.296 -0.43 -0.508 3.41 2.76 3.72 3.51 
 [0.122]** [0.173]** [0.190]*** [1.48]** [1.30]** [2.21]* [2.19]* 
Democracyt-1 -0.121 -0.120 0.007 -0.08 0.01 -0.12 0.004 
(Anocracy omitted) [0.060]** [0.054]** [0.055] [0.05]* [0.04] [0.07]* [0.07] 
Autocracyt-1 -0.083 -0.099 -0.049 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
 [0.040]** [0.038]** [0.045] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] 
Ethnic -0.061 -0.053  0.03  0.01  
   Fractionalization [0.190] [0.185]  [0.15]  [0.20]  
Military Regimet-1  -0.069 -0.085 -0.056 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 
 [0.041]* [0.042]* [0.049] [0.03]** [0.04] [0.05]* [0.06] 
Urbanization 0.482 0.516 -1.139 0.40 -0.93 0.53 -1.18 
 [0.231]** [0.218]** [1.154] [0.15]*** [1.01] [0.23]** [1.27] 
Legislative  -0.034 -0.043 -0.029 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.031] [0.034] [0.037] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] 
Party Coalitionst-1 0.021 0.025 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.01 0.005 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.024] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] 
Party Legitimacyt-1 -0.016 -0.025 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014 0 -0.01 
 [0.053] [0.054] [0.062] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Country dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Trend*country  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2   0.24       
Observations 2223 2166 2166 2223 2223 2223 2223 
F test of excl. 
instruments --- --- --- --- --- 7.90 8.08 
 p- value --- --- --- --- --- (.0050) (.0045) 
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets, p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Marginal effects (dy/dx) at sample averages 
are reported in Probit and IV-Probit regressions 
 
political mobilization will increase more quickly than the appropriate institutions can 
accommodate. 
Our results show that, with increased growth, political mobilization and activism 
increase in regions like Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa where countries are less 








On the other hand, our European sample includes exclusively developed countries (see 
Appendix 2.1.G) where institutions are strong and developed, so people are happy with 
governments when growth rates are high, but unhappy with bad economic conditions as 
suggested by the negative sign of the growth coefficient in column (6), Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5.  Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Unrest by Regions 
   Unrest by Different Regions, IV-Probit 


















Growth t 3.41 6.94 4.42 -7.14 8.08 -2.16  
 [1.48]** [1.37*** [0.97]*** [7.41] [1.11]*** [2.68]  
Democracyt-1 -0.08 -0.06 -0.063 -0.17 -0.12 -0.52  
(Anocracy omitted) [0.05]* [0.10] [0.067] [0.15] [0.25] [0.20]**  
Autocracyt-1 -0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.57  
 [0.04] [0.10 [0.06] [0.19] [0.18]* [0.27]**  
Ethnic 0.03 -0.06 0.37 -0.62 -1.41 -0.43  
     Fractionalization [0.15] [0.469] [0.24] [0.20]*** [1.43] [0.42]  
Military Regimet-1  -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.21 -0.48 -0.19  
 [0.03]** [0.16] [0.04]** [0.13]* [0.02]*** [0.03]***  
Urbanization 0.40 0.53 0.25 -0.09 -0.03 1.02  
 [0.15]*** [0.48] [0.27] [0.45] [0.43] [0.36]***  
Legislative  -0.04 -0.002 -0.06 -0.03 0.16 -0.14  
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.03] [0.088] [0.03]** [0.05] [0.08]** [0.08]**  
Party Coalitionst-1 0.002 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.04 -0.21  
 [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.07]* [0.12] [0.04]***  
Party Legitimacyt-1 -0.005 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.31 0.42  
 [0.04] [0.09] [0.06] [0.07]** [0.29] [0.02]***  
Const        
        
Regional Dummies Yes --- -- -- -- --  
Country dummies No No No No No No  
Trend*country  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
R2          
Observations 2223 453 1002 311 155 296  
        
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets, p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  Marginal effects (dy/dx) at sample averages are reported in Probit and IV-
Probit regressions 
In addition, Olson’s story suggests that instability arises during rapid growth because 
there are vast changes in methods of production, importance of industries, and 
distribution of income. One could argue that there is simply more room for these changes 
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in less developed countries than in developed countries for a given increase in growth 
rates. As changes have greater magnitudes, there will be more gainers and losers, so 
pressure to change political order by the gainers and the political discontent of the losers 
will be much higher in developing countries.  
The Unrest variable can be broadly interpreted as the initial political mobilization of 
masses of populations against current governments or regimes. According to the 
definitions of the variables (Appendix 2.1), these events are relatively peaceful. 
Conceptually, they can eventually just stop or be suppressed by the military and police, 
so that stability returns to the country without radical political changes in the existing 
political order. On the other hand, peaceful protests can grow into something bigger like 
revolutions, peaceful or violent, government crises, and reelections with changes in 
political power, and the worst, civil wars. In Table 2.4, the data and IV results seem to 
indicate that with rising incomes the incidence of relatively peaceful protests increases. 
Whether and how changing incomes are associated with more radical political events in 
our data, we will investigate in next subsections.  
2.6.2 Violent Unrest and Government Crises  
Table 2.6 shows the results of estimated Growth effects on probability of Violent 
Unrest, which is the dummy equal to one if revolutions or guerilla warfare occurred in 
the given year. Estimation order and procedures are similar to those in Table 2.4.29 
Overall, the size and significance of the effects of economic shocks on the probability of 
Violent Unrest is lower than the impacts of Growth on Unrest in Table 2.4. Note that the 
                                                 
29 The difference between the number of observations used in columns (1), (5)-(6) and probit columns (2)-




sign of Growth coefficients switches to positive in the IV regressions as well. The 
estimate of growth impacts is significant at 5 percent in IV-Probit specification (4) and 
one-percent increase in growth raises probability of Violent Unrest by almost three-
percents. The IV-2SLS estimates in (5) are similar to the IV-Probit coefficients but are 
not statistically significant.    
Table 2.6  Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Violent Unrest 
Dependent 
Variable 


















Growth t -0.202 -0.269 -0.236 2.79 2.88 2.18 1.80  
 [0.130] [0.149]* [0.153] [1.55]* [2.01] [1.81] [1.81]  
Democracyt-1  -0.163 -0.126 -0.036 -0.18 -0.22 -0.16 -0.05  
(Anocracy omitted) [0.065]** [0.064]** [0.070] [0.05]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]** [0.08]  
Autocracyt-1 -0.153 -0.126 -0.073 -0.12 -0.17 -0.14 -0.09  
 [0.060]** [0.055]** [0.051] [0.05]** [0.07]** [0.06]** [0.05]*  
Ethnic  0.1 0.063  0.01 0.016 0.14   
   Fractionalization [0.189] [0.193]  [0.10] [0.109] [0.20]   
Military Regimet-1  -0.023 -0.019 0.0004 0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.02  
 [0.043] [0.041] [0.048] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05]  
Urbanization -0.104 0.036 -2.55 -0.15 -0.15 -0.08 -1.81  
 [0.138] [0.150] [1.544]* [0.13] [0.12] [0.14] [1.18]  
Legislative  -0.031 -0.022 -0.047 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06  
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]  
Party Coalitionst-1 -0.003 -0.005 0.023 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 0.02  
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.020] [0.02] [0.024] [0.02] [0.02]  
Party Legitimacyt-1 -0.062 -0.06 -0.033 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03  
 [0.068] [0.062] [0.068] [0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07]  
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No  
Country dummies No No Yes No No No Yes  
Trend*country  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes  
Observations 2223 1928 1928 2106 2223 2223 2223  
R2 0.25 --- --- --- --- --- ---  
F test of excl. instr.     6.66 7.90 8.08  
p- value     (0.0099) (0.0050) (0.0045)  
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets; p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%;  Marginal effects are reported in probit regressions 
 
In Table 2.7, the effects of growth on the likelihood of government crises are 
estimated. Similar to the Table 2.4 results, columns (1)-(3) display negative and 
significant growth effects. In the IV regressions, the sign becomes positive and only 
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significant at a 10 percent level in the IV-Probit column (4). The IV-2SLS columns (6)-
(8) indicate positive estimates but are not statistically significant. It is also clear that the 
Growth coefficient is not robust when country fixed effects and country specific time 
trends are included.  
Regional differences in the estimates of Table 2.7 are not reported as the estimates are 
not informative, because the standard errors are quite large. For the rest of the variables 
(Successful Coups, Assassinations, Changes in Executive, and Cabinet Changes, results 
are shown in Appendix 2.1, Table A2.4), the data does not show a significant relationship 
between growth and the likelihood of these events in the IV regressions. However, 
Growth coefficients are negative but insignificant in the IV regressions. 
In sum, when the joint endogeneity between contemporary growth rates and political 
instability measures is not taken into account, the data displays negative association 
between these variable. Once we use the instrumental variable approach, growth rates are 
positively and significantly related to the incidence of some political events. The IV 
results strongly suggest that higher growth rates of income increase the incidence of 
relatively peaceful protest. The evidence that the likelihood of violent unrest and 
government crises also increases is less significant and robust. Our interpretation is that it 
is much easier to attend peaceful demonstrations and express political demands whereas 
it is much more costly and risky to participate in revolutions and armed violent activities 
where, not only freedom, but also lives are at stake. 
 
  75
Table 2.7 Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Destabilizing Political Events: 
Government Crises 
 













Growth t -0.278 -0.296 -0.336 3.04 1.72   
 [0.129]** [0.120]** [0.125]*** [1.74]* [1.73]   
Democracyt-1  -0.049 -0.03 -0.005 -0.06 -0.03   
(Anocracy omitted) [0.042] [0.028] [0.033] [0.04]* [0.03]   
Autocracyt-1 -0.094 -0.077 -0.087 -0.10 -0.05   
 [0.029]*** [0.018]*** [0.022]*** [0.04]** [0.02]**   
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.051 0.06  0.04 0.09   
 [0.171] [0.122]  [0.08] [0.11]    
Military Regimet-1  -0.005 0.002 0.02 -0.001 -0.01   
 [0.032] [0.030] [0.034] [0.04] [0.03]   
Urbanization 0.108 0.01 -0.913 0.02 0.03   
 [0.170] [0.106] [0.265]*** [0.10] [0.09]   
Legislative  -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.003 -0.005   
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.022] [0.018] [0.019] [0.025] [0.017]   
Party Coalitionst-1 -0.004 0.002 0.007 -0.03 -0.006   
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.015]** [0.011]   
Party Legitimacyt-1 0.064 0.049 0.052 0.05 0.05   
 [0.040] [0.028]* [0.030]* [0.04] [0.03]   
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes   
Country dummies No No Yes No No   
Trend*country  No Yes No No Yes   
          
Observations 2223 2001 2001 2223 2067   
F test of excl. 
instrument        
p-value        
        
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets; p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  Marginal effects are reported in probit regressions 
 
 
2.6.3 More on Controls 
With few exceptions, control variables that are prominently cited in the literature show 
varying statistical predictive powers in different regressions, as shown in Tables 2.4-2.7.  
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Table 2.7 (cont.) Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Destabilizing Political 













    
Growth t 2.02 1.93 1.36     
 [1.50] [1.44] [1.35]     
Democracyt-1  -0.06 -0.05 0.02     
(Anocracy omitted) [0.05] [0.04] [0.06]     
Autocracyt-1 -0.1 -0.08 -0.08     
 [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]*     
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.02 0.09      
 [0.08] [0.17]      
Military Regimet-1  0 -0.02 0.01     
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]     
Urbanization -0.01 0.13 -2.86     
 [0.11] [0.17] [1.15]**     
Legislative  0.01 -0.005 0.01     
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.03] [0.023] [0.03]     
Party Coalitionst-1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01     
 [0.01]* [0.01] [0.01]     
Party Legitimacyt-1 0.04 0.07 0.07     
 [0.04] [0.04]* [0.05]     
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No     
Country dummies No No Yes     
Trend*country  No Yes Yes     
          
Observations 2223 2223 2223     
F test of excl. instrument 6.66 7.90 8.08     
p-value (0.0099) (0.0050) (0.0045)     
        
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets; p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  Marginal effects are reported in probit 
regressions 
   
 
Democracies and Autocracies are more stable than Anocracies in Tables 2.4, 2.6, and 
2.7. Urbanization appears to be important for Unrest (Table 2.4, columns (4)-(5)) and 
Violent Unrest (Table 2.6, column (3)). However, unlike the effect on Unrest, the impact 
of Urbanization on Violent Unrest is negative which is consistent with the fact that most 
rebellions and civil wars are fought in rural environments (Auvinen (1997). 
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The additional support for the importance of institutions is found in estimates of some 
control variables although some estimates are potentially biased due to endogeneity. 
Column (4) in Table 2.4 indicates that Unrest is less probable in regimes controlled by 
the military and in countries with established democracies. Note that in Table 2.5, 
regional differences in size and significance of some control variables have interesting 
implications as well. For example, lower incidence of unrest in Western Europe is 
associated with democracies, military regimes, lower urbanization, more effective 
legislature, and greater political competition measured by the party coalition variable 
(column (6), Table 2.5). In Sub-Saharan Africa, a lower incidence of Unrest is related to 
greater legislative effectiveness, lower ethnic fractionalization, and military regimes. 
Thus, the significance of institutional variables for instability seems to vary across 
regions. These differences also imply that the importance of the strength of institutions 
for political stability in less developed countries. Why would legislative effectiveness and 
regime type be important in Sub-Saharan Africa, but not levels of democracy and the 
variation in political party coalitions? Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa represent 
regions of two extremes in institutional development.  One of the possibilities is that in 
the region where the level of institutional development is very low, the variation in 
democracy levels and political competition provides a poorer measure of institutional 




2.6.4 Robustness Checks and Alternative Instruments 
Additional robustness checks are shown in Table 2.8. Our major finding is that 
economic growth is directly related to probability of Unrest. In Table 2.4, it is clear that 
the IV estimates are robust to inclusion of country fixed effects and country specific time 
trends. The IV-Probit and IV-2SLS coefficients are also very similar. We use columns (4) 
and (5) in Table 2.4 as benchmark specifications to evaluate the robustness of the results. 
In Table 2.8, one should examine whether differences in samples and the use of 
alternative explanatory variables, as well as changes in estimation methods, significantly 
change the IV coefficient of Growth t-1 variable.  
Column (2) adds country fixed effects and excludes all other controls, which 
increases the sample size by almost 200 observations. We see that the growth coefficient 
is slightly lower and still significant at the five-percent level.  
Furthermore, we tested the robustness of the results by adding the level of economic 
development. According to Huntington (1968):  
“The relation between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of 
economic development. At low levels, a positive relation exists, at medium levels no significant relation, 
and at high levels a negative relationship” (p. 53).  
This may suggest that instability is a quadratic function of the level of economic 
development variable. We used the log of moving averages of five observations before 
the current observation of real GDP per capita. The reason for using five-year averages 
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was to reduce the possibility of feedback effects from Unrest to income level. However, 
there is still a possibility that persistent instability may affect income levels in return, but 
our identification strategy is not able to control that. The results are reported in column 
(4), Table 2.8. Both terms in the quadratic form of the economic development variable 
are highly significant and indicate the inverted U shape relationship between economic 
development and Unrest. Growth IV coefficient is again robust to inclusion of the level 
of economic development. Note that exclusion F test in column (4) indicates a great 
improvement in F statistics, which is now equal to 12.62. Thus, control for the level of 
economic development improves the predictive power of the instrument. 
In addition, the lagged two-year moving average of Purges variable is included as a 
control for political repression to test the robustness of the results. Moreover, we will be 
able to test an alternative channel of why lower growth can result in lesser unrest. One 
could argue that lower growth may induce the government to increase the political 
repression to prevent unrest. The repression variable has a positive but insignificant 
impact on the probability of Unrest in column (4) of Table 2.8. Growth coefficient does 
not change dramatically either. Moreover, in separate regression (not shown) we do not 
find that Growth variable has a significant impact on Purges in the IV regression, where 
Growth is instrumented by oil shocks. Therefore, this result does not agree with the 
explanation that lower growth affects unrest through changes in political repression.30 
Freedom house indexes for period 1972-1999 were also tried in the place of Purges 
variable but coefficients are found to be very small and insignificant in regressions 
(results are not shown). 
                                                 
30 However, higher unrest may in turn cause more repression, which will cause the estimate of the effect of 
repressions on unrest to be biased upwards.   
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Another objection to results may arise because secular time trends in oil price 
variation affecting Growth may be correlated independently with the time variation in the 
incidence of Unrest compromising the causal inference of the effects of Growth on 
Unrest.  To account for this possibility, in addition to country-specific time trends, we 
include country-specific time trends squared. Column (6) in Table 2.8 shows that the 
positive sign of Growth coefficient remains and the absolute value of it increases 
although the significance level is slightly lower due to the larger standard error, which 
can be explained by weaker instruments in first stage regression. 
Finally, one can also argue that changes in the world oil prices may not provide 
enough variation to explain changes in growth rates across countries since the former 
only varies with time but not across countries. We address this concern by using the 
alternative form of instruments – country-specific oil shocks, measured as the interactions 
of  Δ+ Ln(Poil)t-12 with country dummies. IVprobit results are reported in column (7) of 
Table 2.8 and IV-2SLS results are reported in column (8). The marginal effect of Growth 
on Unrest is positive and significant at 1 percent level in column (7). However, it is still 
positive but much smaller in absolute value in column (8) than in (7). Such difference 
between IVprobit and IV-2SLS estimates are puzzling. The IV-2SLS coefficient is 1.54 
and significant at 5 percent level if sample is restricted to Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Note that the results of the first stage regression, reported in Appendix 2.1, Table 
A2.5, indicate that increases in oil prices are not always associated with lower growth in 
some countries. For such countries as Gambia, Jordan, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Zimbabwe, coefficients are positive and significant.   
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Table 2.8 Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Unrest: Robustness Checks 
















Growth t 3.41 3.17 3.72 3.1 2.97 4.59  
 [1.48]** [1.65]** [2.21]* [1.94] [1.50]** [2.87]  
Democracyt-1 -0.08  -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.03  
(Anocracy omitted) [0.05]*  [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.05]* [0.07]  
Autocracyt-1 -0.05  -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03  
 [0.04]  [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]  
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.03  0.01 0.15 0.16 0.12  
 [0.15]  [0.20] [0.20] [0.15] [0.40]  
Military Regimet-1  -0.08  -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09  
 [0.03]**  [0.05]* [0.05] [0.04]* [0.07]  
Urbanization 0.40  0.53 0.4 0.27 0.5  
 [0.15]***  [0.23]** [0.27] [0.26] [0.34]  
Ln (Income MA(5))t-1    1.18 1.17   
    [0.53]** [0.61]**   
[Ln (Income MA(5))] 2t-1    -0.07 -0.07   
    [0.04]** [0.04]**   
Purges MA(2)t-1    0.03 0.02   
    [0.02] [0.02]   
Regional Dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country dummies No Yes No No No No  
Trend X Country  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Trend 2  X Country  No No No No No Yes  
Observations 2223 2411 2223 2151 2151 2223  






5.53              
( 0.0188)  
Overid test , χ 2        
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets, p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%;  ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are reported in probit regressions;  Legislative 
















Table 2.8 (cont.) Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Unrest: Robustness 
Checks 
Instrument Δ+ Ln(P oil)t-1






    
Growth t 6.01  0.78     
 [0.48]***  [0.92]     
Democracyt-1 -0.001  -0.12     
(Anocracy omitted) [0.04]  [0.06]*     
Autocracyt-1 0.03  -0.08     
 [0.04]  [0.04]*     
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.13  -0.04     
 [0.10]  [0.19]     
Military Regimet-1  -0.04  -0.08     
 [0.03]  [0.04]*     
Urbanization 0.07  0.49     
 [0.09]  [0.23]**     
        
Regional Dummies Yes  Yes     
Country dummies No  No     
Trend X Country  Yes  Yes     
Trend 2  X Country  No  No     
Observations 2223  2223     
F test of excl. instrument   13.72  (0.0000)     
Overid test , χ 2   65.8 (0.31)     
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets, p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%;  ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are reported in probit regressions;  Legislative 




2.7 Comparison with Miguel et al. results 
 
With the exception of Campos and Nugent (2002), why do other empirical studies not 
achieve similar results to those obtained in this study? One could argue that this happens 
because other studies did not address the joint endogeneity or used invalid instruments. 
However, Miguel et al. (2004) used a very similar method. They estimated the effect of 
economic shocks instrumented by rainfall changes on the incidence of civil conflict. 
Their estimates are not directly comparable to results of this study because our main 
result is more about peaceful protests against existing governments and regimes. 
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Nevertheless, some comparison can be made, and differences in the IV results are 
striking. In Miguel et al. study, the OLS/Probit estimates are very similar to our results in 
Tables 4, 6, and 7, which are close to -0.3. However, the Miguel et al. IV-2SLS results 
are very different from our findings. They have more negative IV coefficients and  
            β 2SLS < β OLS < 0  
Miguel et al. (2004) acknowledged that the IV coefficient should be greater than the OLS 
coefficient in the presence of the downward bias in OLS estimation. They suggest that 
the attenuation bias in the OLS regression may arise from measurement errors in the GDP 
variable, which would bias the OLS estimates towards zero. As a result, if the attenuation 
bias is greater than the downward bias from joint endogeneity, the IV-2SLS estimates 
would be more negative than the OLS estimates. Some of the OLS estimates in their 
study, however, have a positive sign, which casts doubt on this explanation. Another 
explanation is given in the footnote:  
“An alternative explanation for the divergence between OLS and instrumental 
variable estimates is that the first stage systematically underestimates the impact 
of rainfall shocks on economic growth—because of extensive nonclassical 
measurement error in national accounts data—leading instrumental variable 
estimates to exaggerate the impact of economic growth on conflict…” 
However, further explanation and investigation of this statement is not given in their 
study. 
The replication of the results in Miguel et al.(2004) can shed some light on the 
differences in IV results31. Oil shock instruments are statistically rather weak in their 
sample.32  We used rainfall instruments as in Miguel et al. in columns (1)-(6), where (1)-
                                                 
31Thanks to Edward Miguel, the data is available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/data.shtml 
32 The original sample consisted of 41 countries in Sub Saharan Africa but we only used countries that are 
in our sample. This will reduce the number of observations to 501 in 27 countries as opposed to 743 
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(3) are compared to (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) in Table 2.9.   Column (1) presents results 
corresponding to the model used in Miguel et al. (2004). Column (2) separately estimates 
the effect of growth rates at time t while in column (3) the impact of the lagged growth is 
estimated separately. The dependent variable is Civil Conflict, and it is equal to one if 
there was any of the following: Internal Minor Armed Conflict, Internal Intermediate 
Armed Conflict, and Internal War (see Appendix 2.1 for details). In columns (4)-(7), the 
dependent variable is from the Banks-CNTS data used in this study, Violent Unrest and 
Unrest.  
The lagged growth coefficient is negative in (1), (4) and (7) with the greatest 
magnitude in (1), which is the main result in Miguel et al. The effect of current growth on 
Violent Unrest is positive in (2) and (5), but more sizable in (5), which is similar to what 
we find in this study. 
Therefore, differences in the IV results may arise because Miguel et al. used a lagged 
growth variable in addition to the current economic growth variable. In our sample with 
oil shocks instruments, the use of lagged growth rates together with contemporaneous 
growth rates in our model does not provide meaningful results because of the very large 
values of standard errors (not shown). In addition, the effect of lagged growth on Unrest 
in our data is also positive and significant at the ten-percent level (not shown). Thus, the 
differences arise because of the distinct nature of  
                                                                                                                                                 





Table 2.9 Economic Growth and Instability in Sub Saharan Africa: Alternative measures 
and IV specifications using rainfall instruments 
   
Dependent 
Variable 
Civil Conflict ≥ 25 deaths 
(Prio/Uppsala data in 
Miguel et al.) 
S. S. Africa 
Violent Unrest 
(Banks: revolutions & 
guerilla warfare) 




S. S. Africa 
Instruments Rainfall Shocks 
Rainfall 
Shocks 
Rainfall              































Economic  -3.95 0.48  1.53 3.07  -1.28 -0.69   
       Growth t [4.28] [0.88]  [2.52] [1.96]  [2.56] [1.55]   
Economic  -4.27  -3.29 -1.48  -1.91 -0.57  -0.16  
      Growth t-1 [2.69]  [1.99] [2.17]  [1.46] [2.42]  [1.99]  
           
           
Country Fixed  Yes Yes Yes        
  Effects           
Country-specific Yes Yes Yes        
  time trends           
           
           
Observations 491 491 494 490 490 493 490 490 493  
F test of excl. 
instruments:      
    
 












9.90   
(.0018)   
   Growth t-1 
equation 
6.95  
( .0011)  
8.66   
(.0034) 
6.95  
( .0011)  
8.66   
(.0034) 
6.95  
( .0011)  
8.66   
(.0034)  
           
 
the dependent variable and samples. Political events variables in Banks-CNTS data are 
targeted specifically to reflect the activity against existing governments and regimes. 
However, the PRIO/Uppsala database measure of the conflict in Miguel et al. records any 
internal armed activity which involved more than 25 deaths. The conflict may involve, 
for instance, two different ethnic or religious groups but not necessarily existing regimes. 
The correlation between Civil Conflict and Violent Unrest variables in the replication 
data is not very high, 0.56. Therefore, “revolutions of rising expectations” motive may be 
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stronger in Banks-CNTS data especially for variables measuring political mobilization of 
masses against existing governments and regimes.  
8 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, we have studied the effects of economic shocks on the incidence of 
politically destabilizing events. The OLS regressions show that income growth exhibits a 
strong negative correlation with the occurrence of all politically unstable events. In 
contrast, it is found here that if the joint endogeneity is addressed by the Instrumental 
Variable method, higher growth rates are associated with an increased likelihood of some 
events, especially those that indicate relatively peaceful mass protests against existing 
governments and regimes. However, it is important to note that our findings do not apply 
to the whole range of the politically unstable events in the data such as coups d'etat, 
changes in effective executive, cabinet changes, and political assassinations. 
Nevertheless, the finding is very controversial as previous empirical evidence 
suggests either that there is no causal effect of growth on political instability or that it is 
negative. On the other hand, theories by Olson (1963) and Huntington (1968) argue that 
changes in growth rates may be directly related to the incidence of political instability. 
Olson, at the same time, does not deny that the sudden decrease or stagnation in income 
level could also be destabilizing so both rapid economic growth and rapid economic 
decline would tend to increase instability. Perhaps, further research is needed to build an 
empirical model that would be able to examine both types of effects at the same time. 
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In addition, our interpretation of Huntington suggests that the effects of economic 
shocks depend on the level economic development. We find some support of the 
Huntington’s idea that positive relationship is likely in less developed countries, while it 
may be absent or slightly negative in developed countries. We also found that the 
relationship of level of development with respect to unrest display the inverted U shape 
association. However, the level of economic development is itself may be endogenous 
variable and our empirical strategy is not suited to account that. Moreover, studying the 
relationship of economic development and political instability requires approach that 
takes a longer run perspective, which is different from the short run horizon used in this 
study.  
The implications of the results obtained in this study are striking. In fast growing 
countries, it is possible to affect the probability of political unrest by both domestic and 
foreign policies.  For instance, an income redistribution providing some compensation to 
losers from the rapid growth will alleviate their discontent and reduce the likelihood of 
protests. Likewise, an improvement of antitrust laws and regulations enhancing the 
competition and reducing the concentration of economic powers will reduce the 
opportunity of organizing mass protests by gainers.  
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Chapter 3: Estimating Partisan Effects on Income per Capita Growth in 
U.S States: a Regression Discontinuity Approach  
3.1 Introduction 
Whether political affiliations really matter when considering economic policy outcomes, 
has been the subject of long-standing debates within political science and economic 
literature. 
 This study explores the question of whether the differences in Democratic and 
Republican governorship have an impact on economic performance measures such as 
state’s economic growth.  The credible answer to this question would offer an interesting 
contribution to the existing huge body of the empirical literature relating partisan 
differences and economic outcomes33. The credibility, however, is difficult to establish 
due to the well-known issue of endogeneity in the party control variable. This is one of 
the reasons why studies reach such differing conclusions on the significance of party 
control for various policy outcomes. 
 When examining studies of the United States, surprisingly, there are no studys 
analyzing the partisan effects on economic growth using the data from individual states.  
Yet, some studys employ aggregate macroeconomic data for the US and selected OECD 
countries, using such variables as income growth, unemployment and inflation to analyze 
the partisan differences34. It has been found that there are partisan differences for 
                                                 
33 Imbeau et al. (2001) in their meta-analysis identify over 600 studies containing empirical results relevant 
to left-right party ideology and government policies. 
34 Tufte (1978), Alt (1985), Hibbs (1987), Alesina, Roubini and Cohen(1997), Faust and Irons (1999) 
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economic outcome variables for the US as well as OECD countries35.  On the other hand, 
research has been done on income convergence using the data from individual states 
without exploring the aspect of partisan differences. [Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)]  
 Many studys, however, utilize data from the states and test the effects of partisan 
differences on such policy variables as taxes, expenditures, and welfare transfers but not 
income growth36. A survey article by Besley and Case (2003) finds that studys come to 
very different conclusions on the significance of party control for policy outputs due to 
differences in estimation strategies, outcome variables, time periods, and measures of 
party controls.   In particular, they report that much of the earlier literature reveals a very 
little evidence that party control matters for these policy variables37 while some of the 
more recent work38 finds support for party control being important for the various policy 
variables mentioned above.  
 Some authors acknowledge that endogeneity, in the party control variable, may not be 
addressed properly in cross-country studies [Faust and Irons (1999), Drazen (2000)]. The 
endogeneity of voters’ choice, during the elections, makes estimation of causal effects 
difficult. Voters might be affected by expected economic conditions if they can forecast 
future outcomes with some accuracy and, they believe that parties are suited differently to 
specific economic conditions [Leigh (2005)]. Similarly, the desire for particular 
economic outcomes may affect partisan electoral victories, rather than elections causing 
                                                 
35 see details in Drazen (2000, 2001), and literature survey in Franzese (2002)  
36 Besley and Case (1995) tests party control effects on income per capita and find overall no differences. 
However, Democrats that cannot run for reelection show negative and significant  effect. 
37 Winters (1976),  Dye (1984), Plotnick and Winters (1985), Garand (1988), Gilligan and Matsusaka 
(1995). 




economic outcomes [Drazen (2000)]. Studys previously cited by Besley and Case (2003) 
have not discussed the potential endogeneity in the party control variable.  
By contrast, this study tests directly the effects of the party control on income growth 
in the states and also addresses the endogeneity in the variable related to election 
outcomes by employing the Regression Discontinuity (RD) method.  In the context of 
elections, the identifying source of information comes from the bi-partisan feature of the 
US election institutions: the candidate wins only if 50 percent of the vote has been 
obtained39. At this threshold value, the assignment of the party control could be seen as a 
random “treatment” in very close elections. The treatment in this case is assigned to those 
candidates whose vote share crosses the 50 percent threshold. Outcomes for candidates 
whose value of vote share is just below the threshold should represent a valid 
counterfactual for the treated group just above the threshold.  Why so?  Because states 
where, for instance, Democrats just barely won an election are likely to be comparable in 
all other ways to states where Democrats just barely lost the election. Applying the 
Regression Discontinuity method allows estimation of the unbiased effect of partisan 
differences on economic growth in the US states. 
In the next section we will discuss how the RD method is used in the literature within 
the context of elections. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical framework and section 3.4 
outlines the empirical strategy. The results and testing of empirical strategy are presented 
in section 3.5. 
                                                 
39 50 percent is the threshold when there are only two parties. In the study, the focus is only on election 
races between Democrats and Republicans only. 
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3.2 Regression Discontinuity in the Elections Context 
The application of the regression discontinuity approach in the context of elections is 
used by Lee et al. (2004), Lee (2005), Leigh (2005) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2006).  
The first two studys, cited above, study the empirical questions related to U.S. 
Congressional House elections, and, their research questions are different from the one 
posed in this study.  
Lee et al. (2004) study the role of elections in policy formation of politicians in the 
U.S. House. They argue if electoral strength is high then a politician can afford to behave 
in more partisan way while a weaker candidate would be forced to choose more moderate 
policy. In the case of the full policy divergence, the relative electoral strength is irrelevant 
for politician’s behavior measured by subsequent roll-call voting records. Thus, policy 
formation should be tested against changes in electoral strength. However, electoral 
strength is endogenously determined. Focusing on very close elections between 
Democrats and Republicans allows them to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the 
effects of a “randomized” change in electoral strength. According to authors, the initial 
“random assignment” of who wins previous elections generates random assignment of 
greater electoral strength for next elections because incumbents are known to posses an 
electoral advantage. They find no evidence in shifting politicians’ behavior in either party 
when there is an exogenous increase in electoral strength for Democrats.  
Lee (2005) focuses more on validity of using RD method in analyzing the electoral 
advantage to incumbency in the U.S. Congressional House elections. His study argues 
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that RD analysis for this particular data can be seen as credible as the evidence from 
randomized experiment. Lee (2005) also verifies if the randomization worked by 
examining whether treated and control groups have the same distribution of baseline 
characteristics. Author found that there is the advantage to incumbency, and also verified 
that in close elections districts where party wins or loses are similar in pre-determined 
characteristics.  
Both Lee et al. (2004) and Lee (2005) compare bare democratic winners and losers 
during previous Congressional House elections in various districts. The outcome variable 
in Lee et al. (2004) is politicians’ roll-cast voting behavior in the next period while in Lee 
(2005) the outcome is the probability of winning next elections by the democratic 
candidate40. In this study, bare democratic winners and losers in gubernatorial elections 
are compared. The outcomes are subsequent income growth rates in states. Therefore, the 
estimated discontinuity (if any) can be interpreted as the difference in subsequent growth 
performance between states where Democrats barely win elections and states where 
Democrats barely lose elections (Republicans win). However, Lee and coauthors are able 
to use substantially greater number of observations in house elections by districts.  
Pettersson-Lidbom (2006) looks at Swedish local government elections to study the 
differences in fiscal policy and unemployment rates between left-wing and right-wing 
governments so his study employs different country-data and dependent variables. The 
results show that left-wing governments spend and tax 2-3 percent more than right-wing 
governments. Left-wing governments also have lower unemployment rates, which is 
                                                 
40 Whether or not the candidate runs for re-election. 
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partly due to that left-wing governments employ 4 percent more workers than right-wing 
governments. 
Finally, the major focus of Leigh (2005) is to test partisan differences on a very large 
set of policy settings and outcomes (32 measures) using the data from U.S. gubernatorial 
elections. One of the variables in Leigh’s study is the level of income per capita and it 
claims to study a very similar question with the same methodology and data.  The scope 
of the study is very broad. Moreover, the major focus is not the application of regression 
discontinuity method (despite of the title of the article) but rather a small element of the 
RD design is used as a robustness check for results by controlling for vote share variable 
(linear form of control function). The model regresses a given policy or outcome on an 
indicator of whether the governor is a Democrat. Author claims that the endogeneity in 
party control is accounted for by inclusion of the vote share received by the Democratic 
candidate. Effectively, such an approach uses control function in the linear form, and is 
likely to result in misspecification and inconsistent estimates41. It is not clear from the 
results and not discussed in the study in which way controlling for vote share variable 
affects the estimates. Leigh (2005) does not check changes in results by restricting 
sample to close elections. None of the RD method’s validity and credibility checks in the 
context of U.S. gubernatorial elections is done in Leigh (2005). Consequently, it is 
questionable that such empirical strategy exploits to a full degree (if at all) advantages 
offered by RD method and it is not clear if the RD approach is applicable and useful in 
the analysis.    
                                                 
41 see below Section 3.3 for more discussion and common approach used in the literature. 
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In my opinion, the application of the RD method in U.S. gubernatorial elections 
deserves greater attention and more analytical efforts.  First, the focus is on growth in 
income. Second, there is implementation of the RD design by using both more flexible 
control function approach and restricting the sample to close elections. Finally, there is 
verification of the validity of the RD method by checking the distribution of the 
covariates around discontinuity point. The analysis will hopefully help future researchers 
to decide whether the RD approach is a valid and credible identification strategy in the 
context of the U.S. gubernatorial elections 
3 Empirical Framework 
3.3.1 The Model 
A primary focus is estimating the causal impact of a Democratic victory in a U.S. 
gubernatorial race on the measure of the subsequent economic performance measure, 
which is in the form of growth in personal per capita income.  
In particular, the starting point can be presented in the following simple equation: 
Yit = α + βDit + εit      (3.1)   
where Yit is a measure of income per capita growth in state i  at time t,  and Dit   measures 
a party control variable. In this case, it is a dummy variable equal to 1, in time periods 
subsequent to the year when Democrat won the election, until next election year.  
The parameter β should represent the average difference in Y between Democrats and 
Republicans if E[εit| Dit]  = 0. However, voters’ choice Dit may be correlated with an error 
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term because of omitted unobservables such as quality of candidates, the expected 
economic environment and other unmeasured characteristics of voters, states and the 
candidates that are relevant for economic performance measures. If the error term is 
correlated with the party control variable, E[εit| Dit] ≠ 0, due to the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated parameter β would be biased. Following the 
notation used in Lee (2001), and applying to our case, we can express this by 
ititititit BIASDYEDYE +==−= β]0|[]1|[     (3.2)   
where β is the true party effect and ]0|[]1|[ =−== ititititit DEDEBIAS εε . 
The identification of β parameter can be achieved by using regression discontinuity 
design, which under certain conditions will allow us to generate quasi-experimental 
estimates of the effects of “randomized” change in party control on subsequent economic 
performance. The victory or party control is a function of the vote share received by 
Democrat during the elections, Vit,  
   1 if Vit>0.50 
                       Dit = D(Vit) =         (3.3) 
      0 if Vit<0.50 
Dit is a deterministic function of Vit, and, therefore, for given Vit the conditional mean of 
the error term will not depend on Dit or   
E[εit| Dit(Vit), Vit ] = E[εit| Vit]      (3.4) 
In RD method, by comparing bare losers and winners we obtain 
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 [ ] [ ] )(5.05.0|5.05.0| νβνν ∗+=<≤−−+≤< ititititit BIASVYEVYE  (3.5) 
where [ ] [ ]5.05.0|5.05.0|)( <≤−−+≤<=∗ ititititit VEVEBIAS νενεν  and ν > 0 
represents the closeness of the elections. As elections get closer or ν gets smaller, the bias 
term goes to zero and one can obtain unbiased estimates of β [Lee (2001)].  
This strategy is valid if vote shares are randomly assigned to Democrats and 
Republicans. It is true that candidates may have some control over votes they receive 
during the elections but there is an element of chance especially in close races that 
determines the realization of the vote share. For instance, such uncertainty may be related 
to voters’ turnout or delivery of postal ballots. In this case, whether the Democrat wins or 
looses a very close election, would be determined randomly. If one compares average 
Democratic vote shares between states in which they narrowly win and lost elections, one 
can obtain credible estimates of effects of a governor’s party affiliation on subsequent 
economic growth in these states. 
The crucial implication of the RD design is that all observable and unobservable pre-
determined (relative to election at t) characteristics that could influence growth per capita 
in  t + s, are not systematically different between the winning (treatment group) and 
losing (control group) candidates of election at t. Therefore, by checking whether close 
winners and losers are comparable along observable dimensions, one can add some 
credibility to the identification strategy.  
From an implementation point of view, one way is to compare outcomes in very close 
elections where the margin of victory is between 1 and 5 percent.  This approach, 
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however, requires large sample sizes because in smaller samples it can result in large 
standard errors and lead to imprecise estimates. The estimates will be reported for 
different winning margins to see how the estimates change as these margins get closer 
and also to compare with results another approach which is described below. 
The other approach to estimate the treatment effect is to specify and include the 
conditional mean function E [εit | Dit(Vit) , Vit ] = E[ε it| Vit] = k(V)  as a control function 
[Heckman and Robb (1985), van der Klaauw (2002)]: 
ititit uVkDY +++= )(βα      (3.6) 
For given Vit, the conditional mean of the error term will not depend on Dit since V (vote 
share) is a systematic determinant of treatment status D. Thus, by entering the correct 
specification of control function in (6), β can be estimated consistently.  
In the literature, typically the control function is specified as a higher order 
polynomial [Angrist and Lavy (1999), Lee et al. (2004), DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee 
(2005), van der Klaauw(2002), Black, Galdo, Smith (2005), Lemeiuex and Milligan 
(2004)]. However, it is impossible to test the assumption whether control function will 
capture any correlation between treatment variable and unobservables affecting outcomes 
[Black, Galdo, Smith (2005)]. Moreover, misspecified control function is likely to 
produce inconsistent estimates [van der Klaauw(2002)]. That is the reason why the 
empirical literature considers a wide range of alternative polynomial specifications for 
k(V). Angrist and Lavy (1999) use linear and quadratic controls for selection variable. 
Lee et al. (2004), DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee (2005) assume that all control functions 
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are fourth order polynomials interacted with the treatment variable. DiNardo and Lee 
(2004) also report results for lower order polynomials. Lemeiuex and Milligan (2004) 
show linear, quadratic, and cubic functions, as well as linear and quadratic splines 
(separate regressions on both sides of the discontinuity). van der Klaauw (2002) and 
Black, Galdo and Smith (2005) select the order of the polynomial is selected with cross-
validation method, which is used as a tool to measure and compare the predictive ability 
of given  models. 
In this study, the estimation will follow the more common approach in the literature, 
and report regressions which include various forms of control function, polynomials up to 
the fourth order.  
First, the threshold value is subtracted from each Democratic vote share value.  
5.0−= itit VV         (3.7) 
This is done in order to set the intercept equal to the cutoff/threshold value of the vote 
share.  
Second, one should specify the most general model, which estimates both main effect 
of vote share in the form of the polynomial of sufficiently high order and interactions of 
the polynomial with our treatment variable (Democratic governor dummy). The 
interactions are used to account for differences in slopes between lines of the two groups. 
The interactions are used in Lee et al. (2004), DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee (2005).  
Trochim (1984) recommends the multiple criterion approach to select the control 
function by series of steps until likely function is overfitted by several terms. For 
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example, the first step may fit the linear term of the assignment variable V , proceeding 
with adding the first-order interaction of V  and D. In subsequent steps, higher-order 
terms can be added one-by-one until the researcher is fairly confident that model is 
overspecified. Model selection criteria mentioned include: R-squares, significance of 
added coefficients and minimum residual mean squares. Several can be used to make a 
best judgment in the selection process. In addition, we also use cross-validation method 
described below because van der Klaauw (2002) and Black, Galdo and Smith (2005) 
mentioned that the order the polynomial is selected by the cross-validation model 
selection method. 
The method was introduced by Allen (1974) in context of regressions42. Let 
{ }Λ∈= λλ ,MM be a collection of candidate models from which one will select a model 
for the observed data. λ  is the model index belonging to a set Λwhich may be finite, 
countable or uncountable. Let )(⋅f  be a function representing the right hand side of the 
equation (6).  The leave-one-out cross-validation selects a model as follows. Suppose n is 
number of observations in the sample. The method splits the whole data into n sub- 
samples so jy − is the vector with jth observation removed from the original outcome 
vector y. Let jf −λˆ be fitted values of the model λM   on n-1 observations. The cross-










2)ˆ(1)( λλ       (3.8) 
                                                 
42 More details on pros and cons of using cross-validation method in linear model selection see Shao 
(1993). The introduction to the topic can be found in Gentle (2002), p.74-76. 
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The cross-validation model selection criteria is λ that minimizes (8). To compute CV 
scores, one needs to fit model λM  n times, once for each delete-one data
jy − . 
However, any of statistical criteria can not guarantee that optimum function will be 
selected. Therefore, one needs to rely on statistical indicators and analytic judgment to 
select a model that is efficient and minimizes the chance of bias.  
Thus, the suggested approach is to check steps up to the fourth order polynomial, 
which is commonly used in the recent literature. The final step will look like the 
following equation: 




41 ......  (3.9) 
α is both the Y-intercept for control (comparison) group regression line and the predicted 
Y-value for the control group at the election threshold. Therefore, β can be interpreted as 
the main treatment effect, which represents the difference between the two group 
regression lines at the intercept and at the threshold value.  The regression coefficient β 
associated with the Democratic governor dummy D is the RD method’s estimate of the 
effect of Democratic governorship on economic growth.  
3.3.2 Controls 
The state fixed effects are typically employed in the literature on grounds of taking into 
account unobservable characteristics relevant for economic growth. However, the use of 
state fixed effects results in the estimates explaining within states variation at the expense 
of losing the variation between states. Such approach is still very useful in the 
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specifications where there is a greater chance of omitting relevant variables and obtaining 
biased coefficients. But in the valid RD design, there is no need to include additional 
covariates except for control function in equation (8). Thus, in RD method our preferred 
specifications are without fixed effects, although we use them as robustness checks for 
results. 
In practice, it may still be useful to include control variables since the randomization 
may not be perfect. In addition, checking the distribution of the control variables around 
discontinuity point will provide a validity check of how well the randomization worked.  
It appears that population characteristics are commonly used both in economic 
growth literature43 as well as literature that studies partisan differences in fiscal policies44. 
These variables typically include: population growth, percentage of youth and elderly 
population, percentage of black population, percentage of urban population, and college 
education attainment. In addition, one of the major interests of the growth literature is to 
study convergence among economies in the sense that poor economies tend to grow 
faster than rich ones [Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), 
Durlauf and Quah (1999), Islam (1995), Lee et al. (1998)]. In case of the panel data 
estimation, Durlauf and Quah (1999) and Islam (1995) report the growth equation where 
the lagged log of income per capita level is used on the right hand side of the equation. If 
the growth rate is used as a dependent variable, the speed of convergence can be 
calculated as )1ln( +−= θλ , where θ is the estimated coefficient of the lagged log 
income per capita term.  
                                                 
43 See survey in Durlauf and Quah (1999) 




The panel data is constructed for U.S. gubernatorial elections and state income data 
for the period 1928-1991. State election data comes from ICPSR, 1995, Candidate Name 
and Constituency Totals, 1788-1990 (ICSPR Study No. 2). The data was processed to 
keep elections where two top candidates are either Democrat or Republican. There are 
overall 951 of such elections in the sample.  For any year between consecutive elections, 
observations are used for candidates and their received vote shares during previous 
elections held at t. During the election year, the data records received vote shares and 
party affiliation of the elected governor in this year. The elections are typically held in 
November and a governor assumes responsibility in the beginning of the following year. 
Therefore, regressions use lagged values of the Democratic governor dummy. Suppose 
the election takes place in 2000 then the relevant observations for income changes for 
newly elected governor will be 2001 through 2004. In 2004, new elections will be held in 
November and the name of the new governor is recorded in the data. However, the 
relevant observations for economic outcomes in 2004 will be the observations 
corresponding to the governor whose name is recorded in the data in 2003. Lagged values 
are used also for all controls and polynomial in vote share variable.  
Per capita personal income data by states are taken from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis available for 1929 -present. Income numbers are deflated by the US Consumer 
Price Index.  
Data for population variables was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau 
publications. The data is available for every 10 years of the population census so it was 
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interpolated for intervening years.   However, education data is only available by decades 
starting from 1940, in the Decennial Census of Population database. Main regressions do 
not include education variable but it is included when distributions of the covariates 
around discontinuity are checked. The variable represents the percent of the total 
population 25 years and over with a Bachelor's degree or higher. 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Number of 
Observations 
Mean SD 
    
Democrat  2839 0.575 0.494 
Vote Share of Democratic Candidate 2839 0.532 0.118 
Per Capita Personal Income (PCPI) 2805 14407 6464 
Log PCPI 2805 9.45 0.535 
PCPI Growth (change in logs)  2732 0.022 0.069 
Population Growth 2720 0.012 0.012 
Proportion of young, 0-15 2793 0.276 0.055 
Proportion of old, over 65 2793 0.091 0.026 
Proportion of black population 2793 0.075 0.087 
Proportion of urban population 2793 0.6025 0.234 
Proportion of population over 25 with a 
Bachelor's Degree or Higher 
2361 0.0956 0.049 
    
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Simple Comparison of Growth Rates under Democrats and Republicans  
This subsection presents results of an OLS “naive” comparison of the performance 
measures under Democrats and Republicans, which does not take into account the 
potential endogeneity in party control variable.  
Table 3.2 presents the estimates where the economic growth measures are regressed 
on Democratic governors' dummy like in equation (1). Column (1) does not include any 
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control variables. Column (2) includes only demographic and lagged income controls, 
while column (3) controls separately for state and time fixed effects and column (4) 
includes all control variables. Column (1) indicates that under Democrats per capita 
income growth rates are about 0.8 percent higher than under Republicans. The difference 
in the effects of democratic governorship on growth disappears, however, when fixed 
effects are used in (3) and (4). R-squared statistics indicates that fixed effects account for 
about 60 percent of the sample variation. As mentioned before, one cannot exclude the 
possibility that when using within variation under fixed effects specifications, tests may 
not have enough statistical power to reject the null of no relationship between democratic 
governorship and economic growth measures. Therefore, there is a need to look at the 
regression discontinuity method results to see if partisan differences matter for growth 
when endogeneity is addressed under alternative method. 
Table 3.2 OLS Estimates of the effect of democratic governor on Income per Capita 
Growth 
 
     
 1 2 3 4  
Democrat t-1 0.0083 0.0072 0.0021 0.001  
 (0.003)*** (0.0031)** (0.0015) (0.0019)  
      
Log (Income) t-1  -0.022  -0.135  
  (0.0058)***  (0.025)***  
      
State Demographics  No Yes No Yes  
State and Time FE No No Yes Yes  
      
Constant 0.0174 0.23 -0.1147 2.02  
 (0.0017)*** (0.049)*** (0.009)*** (0.35)***  
Observations 2732 2732 2732 2720  
R-squared 0.0036 0.0175 0.63 0.65  
      
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Each column is a separate regression.  





3.5.2 RD estimates – close elections 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the RD results by looking at close elections sub samples. In 
column 1, elections are very narrow so that the candidate wins with a margin of less than 
1 percent. In next columns the winning margin is gradually increased and results are 
reported for winning margins less than 3, 6, 10 and 20 percent in Table 3.3 while in Table 
3.4 control variables are added.  
One can see in Table 3 and in columns 1-4 of Table 3.4 (without fixed effects 
controls) that coefficients of the democratic governor dummy tend to become more 
negative as we look at closer elections while the OLS “naive” comparison coefficient was 
positive and significant in Table 3.2, column 1. This suggests that the RD method is 
getting rid of an upward bias, which was present in OLS estimates in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.3. RD Estimates of the Effect of Democratic governor on Income per Capita 
Growth: Close Elections 
 winning  
margin < 1% 
winning  
margin < 3% 
winning  
margin < 6% 
winning  
margin < 10% 
winning  
margin < 20% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Democrat t-1 -.022 -.008 -0.004 -0.0007 0.0039 
 (0.018) (0.01) (0.006) (0.0043) (0.0034) 
Constant 0.047 0.028 0.025 0.022 0.020 
 (0.01)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** 
Observations 142 402 743 1212 1989 
R-squared 0.021 0.038 0.0008 0 0.0009 
# of elections  52 137 261 415 674 
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.  Each column is a separate regression.  










Table 3.4.  RD Estimates of the Effect of Democratic governor on PCPI growth: Close 


























 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Democrat t-1 -0.04 -0.012 -0.006 -0.0014 0.037 0.001 -0.002 0.0019  
 (0.02)** (0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0042) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0025)  
Log(Income) t-1 -0.053 -0.017 -0.021 -0.023 -0.63 -0.18 -0.17 -0.14  
 
(0.023)** (0.014) (0.011)* (0.01)** (0.137)*** (0.060)*** (0.037)***(0.027)***  
 
State Demogr.  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
State and Time 
FE 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 0.661 0.217 0.229 0.238 4.82 1.74 1.72 1.30  
 (0.188)*** (0.130) (0.092)** (0.078)*** (1.08)*** (0.56)*** (0.38)*** (0.21)***  
Observations 140 397 736 1201 140 397 736 1201  
R-squared 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.75 0.70 0.65  
          
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.  Each column is a separate regression.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level,  ** Significant at the 5 percent level , *** Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
The pattern of changing coefficients towards negative values, as we restrict sample to 
closer elections, can also be seen in Figure 1, which is constructed based on regressions 
of Table 3.3. The graph shows how coefficients and 95% confidence interval change as a 
function of winning margins. One can notice that the confidence interval and standard 
errors get larger as a sample and closeness of elections get smaller. In addition, Figure 2 
shows how standard errors (SE’s) of estimated coefficients change relative to 1/ 2−N , 
where N-2 is the degrees of freedom45. In close elections, the slopes of SE’s curves are 
noticeably steeper than the slope of 1/ 2−N  curve. The standard deviation in Democrat 
dummy does not change much with N. Therefore, increases in SE’s take place because 
unexplained variation in Y’s is increasing as sample gets smaller and elections get closer. 
                                                 


























This casts some doubt on the reliability of the RD’s close elections approach in our study 
because in close elections we are left with too few observations.  
Figure 3.1 RD Estimates: Close Elections Margins and Changes in Estimates of the 
































Graph is constructed based on results of Table 3.3. When Winning Margin is between 0.10 and 0.20, X-
axis scale is reduced to include the estimate in the sample where Winning Margin is 0.20.    
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All reported democratic dummy coefficients are not statistically significant except in 
column 1, Table 3.4.  We do not think that this estimate is reliable because the sample 
size is too small and the reported difference of about 4 percent in growth rates is 
unrealistically high. The reported difference of about 1 percent in column 2 of Table 3.4 
seems more reasonable despite statistical insignificance due to relatively large standard 
error value46. As state and year fixed effects are added in columns 5-8 of Table 3.4, all 
reported coefficients become insignificant. 
Based on significant estimates of the coefficients of lagged log income in Table 3.4, 
the income convergence across states is supported by the data and the implied47 
convergence rate ranges from 1.7 percent to 19.8 percent in columns 2 and 8 respectively. 
Durlauf and Quah (1999) report that estimates in the literature from panel-data analyses 
have varied significantly from 3.8 percent to 30 percent. Differences are due to finite 
sample biases, different estimation methods and datasets.  
To sum RD’s close elections approach in Tables 3 and 4, results for democratic 
governors’ effect on income growth show that the bias presented in OLS estimates is 
being corrected by looking at close elections samples. There is some tendency of the 
estimates towards negative 1 percent differences in growth rates but coefficients are not 
statistically significant. These results show that the RD estimates are subject to a large 
degree of sampling variability. Also, there may not be enough observations to estimate 
more precisely coefficients by restricting the sample around discontinuity point. 
                                                 
46 When standard errors are not clustered, this coefficient is significant at 10 percent level. 





3.5.3 RD estimates – Control Function Polynomial 
This section presents the evidence obtained from the RD estimation using the control 
function approach with full sample. As in the literature mentioned in section 3.1, the 
assumption for control function is that it belongs to the class of polynomial functions. 
Using the stepwise procedure explained in section 3.1, the results are presented step-
by-step in Table 3.5 to select the optimum specification for control function. Thus, eight 
columns in Table 3.5 present eight different specifications of the control function. The 
selection of the model is based on several statistical criteria: R squared, residual mean 
square values and statistical significance of added terms measured by t statistics or by F 
test of whether the additional term should be added to a model. In particular, one should 
pay attention to the greater statistical significance of added polynomial terms, sizable 
upward jumps and subsequent leveling-off in R squares, downward jumps and leveling-
off in residual mean squares.  
Cross-validation method in model selection is also implemented (Shao 1993, Gentle 
2002, p.74-76). Leave-one-out algorithm is used. Each model (step) is fitted n times 
leaving out one observation from estimation. Root mean square error (RMSE) is recorded 
each time. The sum of all estimated RMSE’s for one specific model would represent the 
model selection criteria reported in Table 3.5. Lower value of the criteria would indicate 
better predictive ability.  
The statistical indicators’ are in favor of models in step 5 and 7. However, the 
preferred model is in step 5. Note that coefficient sizes prior to step 5 in Table 3.5 change 
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more dramatically, from -0.17 (step 1) to -0.56 (step 2) then to -0.24 (step 3) and to -0.06 
(step4). After step 5, coefficients display less variability, they change very little in step 6, 
from -1.1 to -1.0, and then to   -0.5 in step 7 and -0.7 in step 8. Recall, however, that 
estimates are prone to bias when the control function is “underspecified” and ideally 
should not be biased if the control function is “overspecified”.  
Table 3.5 Income Growth and RD Estimates: Using Control Function Polynomial in Vote 
Shares, 8 step analysis.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Democrat t-1 -0.0017 -0.0056 -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007  
 (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.01) (0.011)  
Vote Share t-1 0.062 0.16 0.225 0.176 0.291 0.206 0.282 0.515  
 (0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.055)*** (0.119) (0.126)** (0.258) (0.261) (0.443)  
Vote Share2 t-1   0.293 0.063 1.384 0.409 1.912 6.504  
   (0.135)** (0.452) (0.661)** (2.504) (2.627) (7.281)  
Vote Share3 t-1     3.585 0.940 10.40 39.29  
     (1.305)*** (6.230) (7.774) (41.92)  
Vote Share 4 t-1       18.08 73.29  
       (8.22)** (76.15)  
Democrat X  -0.122 -0.293 -0.252 -0.039 0.054 -0.384 -0.605  
    Vote Share t-1  (0.05)** (0.098)*** (0.129)** (0.148) (0.292) (0.374) (0.479)  
Democrat X     0.250 -3.292 -2.372 0.378 -4.355  
    Vote Share2 t-1    (0.480) (1.407)** (2.634) (2.962) (7.892)  
Democrat X       2.732 -22.60 -50.97  
    Vote Share3 t-1      (6.393) (13.84) (41.82)  
Democrat X         -55.81  
    Vote Share4 t-1        (77.47)  
          
Observations 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732  
R-squared 0.0094 0.0127 0.0147 0.0148 0.0196 0.0197 0.0217 0.0220  
Residual Mean 
Squares .0047228 .0046680 .0046601 .0046613 .0046404 .0046417 .00463 .00463
 
p value of F test  0.0026 0.0179 0.5804 0.0003 0.6247 0.0168 0.1422  
Cross-validation 
criteria .0684241 .0683227 .06826499 .06827368 .0681206 .06813011 .06807 .06808
 
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  




In addition, Figure 3 shows a graphical analysis of the polynomial fit in step 5. To obtain 
meaningful scattered plots, all values for income growth are averaged within certain 
intervals of vote shares48. The plot provides a visual representation about the estimated 
discontinuity at the cutoff point of vote shares.   
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Each scatter point represents the average growth within certain interval of Democrats’ vote share. Intervals equal 
to 0.5% when vote share is between 40% and 60% (between -0.1 to 0.1 on the graph). Solid lines represent fitted 
values from polynomial regressions in vote share and interactions of democratic governor dummy with 
polynomial in full sample from Table 3.5, column 5. 
   
Model in step 5 of Table 3.5 shows that democratic governors’ performance is worse 
by 1.1 percent but the coefficient is not significant. When adding population and income 
convergence controls in Table 3.6 using step 5 and step 7 models, the estimates in Table 
3.6 are very similar to estimates in columns 5 and 7 of Table 3.5. Implied convergence 
rate is about 2.2 percent in columns 1-2, and 14 percent in columns 3-4 where fixed 
                                                 
48 The intervals are chosen such that they contain at least 30 observations of growth rates at tails of the 
distribution of vote shares. Then intervals are gradually reduced such that they are equal to 0.5 percent 
where vote shares are in between 40 percent and 60 percent. Then fitted polynomial line is drawn from 
regression 5 in Table 3.5. 
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effects are added. In fixed effects models in 3 and 4, the difference between Democrats 
and Republicans becomes smaller in terms of sizes of the coefficients.  
Table 3.6 Income Growth and RD Estimates: Using Control Function Polynomial in Vote 
Shares, Adding Controls. 
 
 Step 5 Step 7   Step5 Step 7  
 1 2   3 4  
Democrat t-1 -0.013 -0.006   -0.0001 -0.001  
 (0.008) (0.009)   (0.004) (0.005)  
Vote Share t-1 0.324 0.381   0.021 0.287  
 (0.128)** (0.257)   (0.060) (0.144)*  
Vote Share2 t-1 1.442 2.822   0.193 3.508  
 (0.703)** (2.600)   (0.320) (1.427)**  
Vote Share3 t-1 3.610 13.66   0.811 12.27  
 (1.410)** (7.55)*   (0.471)* (3.71***  
Vote Share 4 t-1  21.08    8.382  
  (7.596)***    (3.532)**  
Democrat X Vote Share t-1 -0.060 -0.522   0.031 -0.411  
          (0.151) (0.356)   (0.074) (0.163)**  
Democrat X Vote Share2 t-1 -3.453 -0.007   -0.700 -1.994  
          (1.499)** (2.913)   (0.540) (1.731)  
Democrat X Vote Share3 t-1  -28.31    -18.89  
            (12.81)**    (5.52)**  
Log (Income) t-1 -0.022 -0.022   -0.134 -0.137  
 (0.004)*** (0.004)***   (0.019)*** (0.020)***  
State and Year Fixed Effects No No   Yes Yes  
State Demographics Yes Yes   Yes Yes  
Const 0.224 0.224   1.329 1.346  
 (0.037)*** (0.041)***   (0.191)*** (0.196)***  
Observations 2693 2693   2693 2693  
R-squared 0.0320 0.0346   0.65 0.65  
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Each column is a separate regression.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Overall, the evidence from RD estimation is suggestive about the slightly worse 
performance of democratic governors but it is not strong in terms of statistical 
significance across all specifications. The polynomial fit results, using the full sample, 
are also very similar to close elections results in Tables 3 and 4. The RD method does its 
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job in terms of reducing the upward bias resulting from simple OLS comparisons 
between Democrats and Republicans. Next section will look at the distribution of 
predetermined characteristics around the discontinuity point.  
3.5.4 Checking Empirical Strategy 
The empirical test within the RD framework importantly relies on the assumption of 
random assignment of the winner in close elections [Lee (2004)]. One of the implications 
from the analysis: when comparing closer and closer elections, all predetermined 
characteristics of Republican and Democratic states become more and more similar. 
Consider this in Table 3.7. In rows, the averages of variables, which should be 
determined before time of elections, are first calculated for the whole sample. Then the 
sample averages are calculated as elections get closer. Like in Lee (2003), we finally do 
the parametric polynomial fit.49 The coefficient in column 13 can be interpreted as a 
predicted difference between Republicans and Democrats with respect to predetermined 
characteristic at 50 percent of vote share. 
First consider geographical locations. States are classified into 4 regions according to 
US Census classification.50  Averaging over entire sample of all elections, Democrats, on 
average, win more elections in the South while losing more in the Northeast and Midwest 
(columns 1-3). 
                                                 
49 The dependent variable is a predetermined characteristic which is regressed on Democrat dummy, the 4th 
order polynomial of democratic vote share and interactions of the polynomial with democratic dummy. 
 
50 Northeast: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, PA. South: DE, MD, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, KY, 
TN, AL, MS, AR, LA, OK, TX. Midwest: MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS, OH, IN, IL, MI, WI.  West: 




Table 3.7. Difference in Regional and Population Characteristics during elections. Democratic candidates, Winners vs. Losers 
 
 All elections margin < 10% margin < 5% margin < 2% Polynomial fit 
 Win Lose Diff. Win Lose Diff. Win Lose Diff. Win Lose Diff. Dem. Dummy coefficient  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Northeast 0.19 0.29 -0.10 0.22 0.26 -0.04 0.25 0.30 -0.05 0.36 0.29 0.07 -0.08 
   (0.027) ***   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.09) (0.08) 
South 0.36 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.06 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 
   (0.027)***   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.06) (0.07) 
Midwest 0.21 0.37 -0.16 0.32 0.34 -0.02 0.34 0.32 0.03 0.34 0.29 0.05 0.06 
   (0.029)***   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.09) (0.08) 
West 0.244 0.237 0.017 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.24 0.27 -0.03 0.07 
   (0.028)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.09) (0.08) 
#of elections  951 415 216  102  951 
Population:              
Educationt-1 0.090 0.083 0.007 0.088 0.086 0.001 0.085 0.088 -0.003 0.089 0.087 0.002 -0.005 
   (0.003)**   (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.01) (0.01) 
# of elections 707 319 160 73 707 
    Old t-1 0.087 0.095 -0.008 0.087 0.094 -0.007 0.086 0.095 -0.009 0.090 0.089 0.001 -0.006 
   (0.002)***   (0.002)***   (0.003)***   (0.005) (0.005) 
    Youngt-1 0.28 
0.272
4 0.0076 0.282 0.273 0.0096 0.286 0.270 0.016 0.275 0.274 0.001 0.017 
   (0.003)**   (0.006)   (0.008)**   (0.013) (0.011) 
     Blackt-1 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.049 0.047 0.002 0.037 0.053 -0.015 0.034 0.049 -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.005)***   (0.006)   (0.008)**   (0.009)* (0.013) 
Ln(Income)t-1 9.34 9.43 -0.09 9.38 9.45 -0.07 9.33 9.49 -0.16 9.40 9.43 -0.03 -0.12 
   (0.04)***   (0.05)   (0.07)**   (0.09) (0.10) 
# of elections 878 395 203 97 878 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. “Diff.” shows the difference between means. In the parametric fit, the dependent variable is regressed on democrat dummy, the 4th 
order polynomial of democratic vote share and interactions of the polynomial with democratic dummy.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Next we look at the population characteristics. The differences are smaller for 
percentage of people with higher education as elections get closer. For percentages of an 
older population, the difference does not get smaller for sample of elections where 
margins are less than 10 percent and 5 percent but for the margin less than 2 percent it is 
smaller. In the polynomial fit, the difference is small and not statistically significant. For 
the percentage of black, the difference is smaller in closer election sample and not 
statistically significant in polynomial fit.  
We finally test the identifying assumption by looking at the differences in pre-
election log income levels. Log income averages are bigger in the sample with margin 
less than 5 percent and smaller in the other two sub samples. It is insignificant in the 
polynomial fit.  
Although not perfect, overall the randomization around discontinuity point is 
supported by data. This lends more credibility to the RD results obtained in this study. 
6 Conclusions 
The analysis in this study shows that the RD design is a powerful tool to address the 
endogeneity in party control variable using the data from US gubernatorial elections. The 
RD method does its job in addressing the upward bias in OLS estimates. In OLS 
regressions, a naïve comparison of growth rates shows slightly better (about 1 percent) 
performance of Democratic governors. 
However, the RD estimates suggest that under Democratic governors the growth rates 
may be lower by about 1 percent but the evidence is not very strong because of the low 
statistical significance level. Alternatively, one could suggest with greater confidence that 
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the relationship between Democratic governorship and economic growth is at least not 
positive as a simple correlation may suggest first.  
 Addressing the endogeneity in party control variable with RD method offers a 
great scope for the analyses of the relationships between election and economic 
outcomes. However, the main challenge would be the availability of the data.  RD 
method requires very large sample sizes to obtain more credible results. Further analysis 
can examine the effects of partisan differences on fiscal policies in US states.  An even 
more ambitious project would be to evaluate the differences in economic performance 


























Appendix 1.1   Table A1.1 Country Level Survey Measures and External Indexes 























Albania 6.6 36.29 -0.13 12.41 3.31 1.61 0.48 2.07  -0.37 2.50 -0.85 
Armenia 9.5 4.43 0.12 2.80 0.92 1.13 0.11 2.34  0.13 Na -0.72 
Azerbaijan 10.3 10.31 0.03 2.94 2.74 1.24 0.30 2.16  -0.82 2.00 -1.07 
Belarus 4.83 35.39 0.25 7.16 1.49 1.19 0.17 2.47  -1.67 4.80 -0.78 
BiH 5.17 9.53 -0.07 8.81 0.95 1.95 0.84 2.53  -0.93 Na -0.60 
Bulgaria 5.03 8.43 0.05 3.74 1.95 1.58 0.70 2.80  0.62 4.00 -0.17 
Croatia 4.43 31.86 -0.09 5.88 0.64 1.55 0.33 2.18  0.19 3.80 0.23 
Czech 2.87 15.94 -0.03 2.79 0.92 1.24 0.29 2.45  1.12 3.70 0.38 
Estonia 5.8 37.88 0.41 4.06 0.34 1.49 0.22 1.94  1.35 5.60 0.66 
FYROM 0.43 1.51 0.06 8.99 0.79 1.48 0.81 2.08  -0.10 Na -0.73 
Georgia 3.5 14.80 -0.37 11.60 2.74 1.61 0.49 2.21  -0.82 2.40 -1.03 
Hungary 4.17 30.95 0.43 6.89 0.97 1.38 0.18 2.22  1.21 4.90 0.60 
Kazakhstan 10.8 37.57 -0.15 9.08 2.10 1.24 0.13 2.00  -0.74 2.30 -1.05 
Kyrgyzstan 3.3 13.27 -0.40 6.90 3.70 1.59 0.42 2.24  -0.46 Na -0.84 
Latvia 6.57 24.59 0.08 8.47 0.93 1.42 0.44 1.85  0.86 3.70 0.09 
Lithuania 5.47 20.30 -0.03 7.49 0.74 1.24 0.31 1.62  0.98 4.80 0.25 
Moldova 4.53 24.63 -0.14 7.21 2.07 1.25 0.35 2.49  -0.17 2.10 -0.89 
Poland 2.17 0.27 0.09 9.54 1.22 1.41 0.21 2.65  0.67 4.00 0.39 
Romania 3.67 41.15 0.07 9.26 2.57 1.51 0.37 2.55  0.04 2.60 -0.34 
Russia 6.07 49.39 -0.36 9.79 1.43 1.34 0.15 2.31  -0.30 2.70 -0.90 
Slovakia 3.2 26.86 0.03 7.03 1.45 1.41 0.40 2.50  0.76 3.70 0.28 
Slovenia 3.53 21.38 0.09 5.08 0.80 1.27 0.29 1.82  0.81 6.00 0.89 
Ukraine 6.53 42.46 -0.10 11.21 2.19 1.40 0.33 2.44  -0.62 2.40 -0.96 
Uzbekistan 3.73 37.67 0.43 7.23 1.45 1.22 0.34 2.45  -1.44 2.90 -1.03 
Yugoslavia 4.83 12.06 0.15 11.52 1.52 1.61 0.51 2.43  -0.60 Na -0.80 
Min 0.43 0.27 -0.40 2.79 0.34 1.13 0.11 1.62  -1.67 2.00 -1.07
Max 10.80 49.39 0.43 12.41 3.70 1.95 0.84 2.80  1.35 6.00 0.89
St. Dev 2.41 14.08 0.22 2.82 0.89 0.19 0.19 0.28  0.85 1.20 0.64
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Table A1.2 Comparison of within and between country standard deviations of Xis 
 
 









to Financing)   
Albania 0.74 11.56 3.62 1.03 1.10  
Armenia 0.97 5.34 2.89 0.53 1.18  
Azerbaijan 1.37 5.58 4.44 0.79 1.06  
Belarus 0.84 11.16 4.01 0.73 1.17  
BiH 0.86 11.58 2.12 1.22 1.12  
Bulgaria 0.91 7.65 3.10 1.00 1.18  
Croatia 0.71 9.33 1.78 0.98 1.24  
Czech 0.77 5.75 2.13 0.62 1.16  
Estonia 1.04 8.42 1.02 0.88 1.05  
FYROM 1.12 12.91 1.07 0.94 1.08  
Georgia 1.00 16.12 3.72 1.11 1.03  
Hungary 1.06 10.11 2.15 0.80 1.20  
Kazakhstan 0.91 13.18 3.89 0.84 1.07  
Kyrgyzstan 0.73 11.57 5.85 1.21 1.11  
Latvia 0.81 11.29 1.99 1.00 1.03  
Lithuania 0.77 10.65 1.83 0.77 0.96  
Moldova 0.64 6.94 3.70 0.79 1.14  
Poland 0.72 13.32 2.61 0.97 1.17  
Romania 0.87 10.72 4.19 1.17 1.20  
Russia 0.80 14.45 2.50 0.90 1.14  
Slovakia 0.71 9.09 2.57 1.03 1.21  
Slovenia 0.76 9.50 3.56 0.74 1.00  
Ukraine 0.89 14.69 4.18 1.11 1.19  
Uzbekistan 1.19 11.50 3.04 0.74 1.19  
Yugoslavia 1.03 13.70 3.24 1.08 1.16  
Average of 
SD(Xis) 0.89 10.64 3.01 0.92 1.13  
       








Appendix 1.2  
Measuring Institutions – the Quality of Courts   
The courts’ quality variable measures the overall quality of the court system in 
solving business disputes. The respondents had to evaluate on a scale of 1(“never”) 
and 6(“always”) how often the court system is fair, uncorrupted, quick, affordable 
and able to enforce its decisions. These attributes seem all to contribute to firms' 
perception of the effectiveness of courts but each of them also captures a unique 
aspect of an underlying quality. The first two categories, "fair" and "uncorrupted", are 
highly related to each other. Corrupted court cannot be fair and vice versa. 
Furthermore, these two seem to be more important for court effectiveness. If the 
probability of the court being unfair or corrupted were high then entrepreneurs would 
consider the system to be less effective and less likely to use it in business disputes 
even if courts are affordable, quick and able to enforce its decisions. The latter two 
attributes would be also important for measuring the quality of the system since the 
"fair" decision must be enforceable in timely manner if system is indeed effective.   
One approach to analyzing subjective perceptions, to gain insights from survey 
responses, is through factor analysis which is a statistical technique applied to a single 
set of variables to discover which groups of variables in the set form coherent subsets 
that are relatively independent of one another. Variables that are correlated with one 
another and are also largely independent of other subsets of variables are combined 
into factors. Factors are thought to be representative of the underlying processes that 
have created the correlations or covariances among variables. This framework fits 




The factor analysis of the dataset (Table A1.3) supports the intuition developed in 
the previous paragraph. The data reveals only one unobservable factor, the underlying 
courts' quality, which accounts for variation in observed characteristics provided by 
survey. Factor loadings show the specific association between factors and original 
variables. As expected, factor loadings for fair and uncorrupted courts are highest 
indicating the first-degree significance of those for courts' quality. The remaining 
three observable characteristics are also important as indicated by their factor 
loadings. Since the results of the factor analysis are consistent with the intuition 
developed, variables can be transformed into linear combinations of an underlying 
unobserved Quality of Courts variable. 
 Table A1.3 Factor Analysis for Courts Quality 
Component  
 
Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
Proportion 
1        2.39890 2.25390 1.1154    1.1154 
2 0.14500 0.24193 0.0674 1.1828 
3 -0.09693 0.03354 -0.0451 1.1377 
4 -0.13048 0.03525 -0.0607 1.0771 
5 -0.16572   . -0.0771 1.0000 
How often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in 




Honest/Uncorrupted  0.79127 
Fair and impartial    0.78224 
Able to enforce its decisions 0.63183 








Appendix 1.3   
Survey Questions and correlations for Business Regulation Questions 
Observations with "don't know" answers were recoded as missing observations.  However, 
omitting "don't know" answers may create a selection bias in corruption variables as those firms that 
are reluctant to confess to corrupt behaviors are more likely to respond with a "don't know". If these 
firms are relatively poor or good performers and they are heavily engaged in corrupt activities, the 
corruption coefficients (γ) would be biased. Moreover, averaging responses may understate or 
overstate the country’s level of corruption. These concerns have to be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
Business Regulations 
Q.25 What was the average and the longest number of days in 2001 that it took from the time your 
goods arrived in their point of entry (e.g. port, airport) until the time you could claim them from 
customs? 
 
Q.46a. Information on the laws & regulations affecting my firm is easy to obtain 
 
Q.46b. Interpretations of the laws and regulations affecting my firm are consistent & predictable 
Strongly disagree=1  Strongly agree=6 
 
Q.49 How likely do you think it is that an unforeseen change in laws or regulations will occur in 2003 
and have a significant impact on your business?  
Extremely unlikely =1  Extremely likely = 6 
 
Q.50 What per cent of senior management’s time in 2001 was spent in dealing with public officials 
about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain access to 
public services? ...%  
 
Q.51 How often is the following statement true? “If a government agent acts against the rules I can 
usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to 
unofficial payments/gifts.” 
Never =1  Always=7 
 
Rule of Law 
Q.41 How often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in resolving 
business disputes? a)Fair and impartial; b) Honest/uncorrupted; c) Quick; d) Affordable; e) Able to 
enforce its decisions 
Q.42 To what degree do you agree with this statement? “I am confident that the legal system will 
uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes”. 
Q.43e How many cases in civil or commercial arbitration courts have involved your enterprise either 
as a plaintiff or defendant since January 2000? 
Q.44 Do you pay for security (equipment, personnel, etc. excluding “protection payments”) or 
protection payments? If yes, what per cent of your total annual sales do you pay? 
 
Influence and Lobbying 
Q.51a Is your firm a member of a business association or chamber of commerce? 
 
Q.51b What services do you receive from the association or associations to which you belong, and 
what is the value of these services to your firm? “Critical value to your firm” should be placed on 
services that significantly reduce the costs of your firm or significantly increase the sales of your firm. 
 




Q.53 How much influence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national 
laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your business? 
Your firm, Your domestic competitors, Other domestic firms, Foreign firms, A business association to 
which you belong, Other business associations, Dominant firms or conglomerates in key sectors of the 
economy, Labour unions, Organised crime, Regional or local government, Military, Individuals or 
firms with close, personal ties to political leaders, International development agencies or foreign 
governments  
No impact =0  Decisive Influence =4 
 
Corruption and State Capture 
 
Q.54a It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get things done ” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc 
Never Always 
Q.54b Firms in my line of business usually know in advance about how much this ‘additional 
payment/gifts’ is. Never Always 
Q.55 On average, what percent of total annual sales do firm’s like yours typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials? ...%  
Q.56 Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in a given year, 
could you please tell me how often would they make payments/gifts for the following purposes: (a)To 
get connected to and maintain public services (electricity and telephone); (b) To obtain business 
licenses and permits; c) To obtain government contracts ; d) To deal with occupational health and 
safety inspections; e) To deal with fire and building inspections; f) To deal with environmental 
inspections; g) To deal with taxes and tax collection; h) To deal with customs/imports; i) To deal with 
courts; j) To  influence the content of new legislation rules decrees etc. 
Never =1  Always =6 
Q.57 When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the contract value 
would be typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure the contract? 
……………% 
Q.58 Recognising the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, 
what per cent of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports 
for tax purposes? …%  
Q.59 It is often said that firms make unofficial payments/gifts, private payments or other benefits to 
public officials to gain advantages in the drafting of laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding 
government decisions. To what extent have the following practices had a direct impact on your 
business? a) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Parliamentarians to affect their votes; b) Private 
payments/gifts or other benefits to Government officials to affect the content of government decrees; c) 
Private payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions of criminal court cases 
d) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions in commercial cases; e) 
Private payments/gifts or other benefits to central bank officials to affect central bank policies and 
decision; f) Illegal contributions to political parties and/or election campaigns to affect the decisions of 
elected officials 




Q.64 What proportion of your firm’s working capital and new fixed investment has been financed from 
each of the following sources, over the past 12 months?  
Q.65a Thinking of the most recent bank loan or overdraft you obtained, did the financing require 
collateral? 
Q.65b What kind of collateral (e.g. land, buildings, machinery, your home) was required?  
Q.65c What was the approximate value of the collateral required as a percent of the loan value?   
Q.65d What is the loan’s annual cost (i.e. rate of interest)?….%  
Q.65e What is the duration of the loan in months? 
Q.65f How many days did it take to agree the loan with the bank from the date of application? 
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Q.65h Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If your firm were to fall behind in its bank 
repayments, which of the following would best describe how you would expect the bank to react? 
Q.66 Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. Suppose that your firm has to obtain a loan 
from a commercial bank. How easy would it be for your firm to obtain a short-term working capital 
loan on commercial terms. And how easy would it be for your firm to obtain a longer term banking 
loan for new investment 
Q.72b Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question: Suppose that the incoming cash flow to 
your firm for the next quarter is 10% lower than you had expected. This cash flow is not permanently 
lost, but merely unexpectedly delayed. However, your working capital needs and level of production 
remain the same. Please look at this list and select at most 4 sources from which you would finance 
this gap. For each of the source selected, please indicate its importance. 
Q.73 Does your firm use international accounting standards (IAS)? 
Q.74 Does your establishment have its annual financial statement reviewed by an external auditor? 
Q.75 How long does it take to clear (in days) the following payments through your financial institution 
and what is the charge you pay as a per cent of the transaction? 
Q.76 What share of your sales to your customers (in per cent) in 2001 was ultimately settled by: 
Q.77 What share of your purchases from suppliers in 2001 was ultimately settled by: 
Q.78 Do you currently have any payments overdue (by more than 90 days) to each of the following. If 
yes, what is the amount of the overdue payments as a % of your total annual sales? 
Q.79 Since 1998, has your firm received any subsidies from the national government, regional/local 
governments or any other sources? If yes, on average since 1998, what was the amount of these 




Q.80 Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the operation and growth of your 
business: a) Access to financing (e.g., collateral required) or financing not available from banks; b) 
Cost of financing (e.g., interest rates and charges); c) Telecommunications; d) Electricity; e) 
Transportation;  f) Access to land ;g) Tax rates; h) Tax administration; i) Customs and trade 
regulations; j) Business licensing and permits; k) Labour regulations; l) Skills and education of 
available workers; m) Economic policy uncertainty; n) Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchange 
rate); o) Functioning of the judiciary; p) Corruption; q) Street crime/theft/disorder; r) Organised 
crime/Mafia; s) Anti-competitive practices of other producers; t) Contract violations of by customers 
and suppliers; u)Title or leasing of land  










of laws and 
regulations 










 1.00     
Easy to obtain regulatory 
info,  -0.06*** 1.00    
Consistency and 
predictability of laws and 
regulations 
-0.11*** 0.51*** 1.00   
Ave # of days for custom 
clearance 0.06** -0.01 0.01 1.00  
Ability to get correct 
treatment from other 
official 
-0.05*** 0.19*** 0.21*** -0.02 1.00 
       ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A1.5 Corruption and State Capture related ratings correlations 
 Corrupti

























Courts  Average 
 
Corruption, as % of sales 1.0             
State Capture 0.18 1.0            
How common is bribing? 0.41 0.27 1.0           
How often is bribing for:              
   Utility services 0.23 0.33 0.31 1.0          
  Licensing  0.31 0.40 0.49 0.48 1.0         
   Gov. contracts 0.29 0.46 0.39 0.35 0.53 1.0        
   Fire inspections 0.28 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.57 0.50 1.0       
   Env. inspections 0.27 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.72 1.0      
   Tax inspectors 0.35 0.41 0.51 0.45 0.56 0.43 0.56 0.54 1.0     
   Customs 0.25 0.47 0.43 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.59 1.0    
   Courts 0.25 0.58 0.37 0.38 0.50 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.63 1.0   
 Average 0.38 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.75 0.76 1.0  
State Capture 2 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.45 1.0 
 




Evaluating Reverse Causality Problem in Estimation of  γ’s 
 
The important caveat to the results at the firm level may be the feedback effect from 
firms’ performances to perceptions of institutional variables. If the firm is not doing well, 
there may be a tendency to give qualitatively lower scores to such variables as corruption, 
courts’ quality and regulatory burden.  
Take for instance corruption, unhappy manager is likely to complain about the higher 
extent of corruption so there is a negative feedback effect from performance to reported 
corruption measure. If the measure of corruption negatively affects growth of sales in 
OLS regression, the feedback effect from the latter is likely to induce downward bias in 
OLS estimates. 
Similar logic applies to regulatory burden and obstacles to financing variables in this 
study. The situation is somewhat different with the state capture. As before, with better 
firms’ performance, the respondent is likely to complain less about state capture activities 
so OLS estimates are biased downwards. If the state capture benefits the individual firm, 
the true effect is bigger than the OLS estimate. Likewise, courts’ quality effect is likely to 
be underestimated by OLS in the presence of reverse causation problem.    
To see this, consider a simple example. The estimated equation is  
 isisis uXY += γ     (1) 
and suppose that Xis  is function of Yis,  
isisis eYX +=θ     (2) 























. If higher Yis  leads to 
smaller Xis  (θ < 0) and 1-θγ >0  then estimated γ will be biased downwards. 




 will depend on whether the term 1-θγ is greater or smaller than zero. The firm-
specific effect of corruption γ on growth of sales of firms is likely to be smaller than one 
in absolute value because corruption is measured as a percentage of sales. One percent 
increase in corruption payments will not likely to decrease sales by more than one 
percent. Likewise, drop in sales will not likely to induce the respondent to report two 
times more than the firm actually gives in corruption payments   so θ is likely to be less 
than one in absolute value either. If 1-θγ is greater than zero then the estimated effect of 
corruption will be biased downwards. 
Considering State Capture’s influences on growth of rims, the conjectured true γ for 
state capture is positive. If the hypothesized feedback effect θ is negative then   1- θ γ is 
positive and estimated γ will be biased downwards without ambiguity.  
To evaluate the extent of the joint endogeneity problem in firm-level estimates, we 
use the propensity of complaining measure from the data. 
If this feedback effect is present, the data should show at least some statistically 
significant negative correlation between propensity to complain and growth of sales. 
One way to control the propensity of managers to complain in the surveys that are 
similar to BEEPS is to use the average rating of quality and efficiency of public services 
 
  127
related to infrastructure like roads, postal service, power, telephone and water to 
approximate a respondent’s tendency to complain. The idea comes from Hellman et al. 
(2000) who compare country averages of survey responses about infrastructure to 
external objective measures. We further argue that the subjective individual variation in 
ratings of these services should be smaller than the individual variation in ratings of 
corruption, for example. Actual differences in the ratings of infrastructure partly can be 
explained by differences among managers in their tendency to complain about 
everything.  
The propensity to complain variable was constructed by calculating the individual 
deviations of equally weighted mean ratings of telecommunication, electricity, and 
transportation services. We first construct the lack of infrastructure variable, which is 
calculated as the average of individual responses to the question about how problematic 
are telecommunication, electricity, and transportation services for operations and growth 
of firms. We measure the propensity to complain as individual deviations of constructed 
measure from country’s average.  
The variable is not significantly correlated with growth of sales  (-0.9 percent), 
negatively correlated with firms’ deviations in ratings of courts’ quality while positively 
correlated with firm-level measures of regulatory burden, corruption, state capture 
variables and obstacles to financing (Table A1.6).  
Table A1.6 Simple correlations of Propensity to Complain and Firms’ Deviations in 














-0.009 -0.055*** 0.076*** 0.0594*** 0.0973*** 0.2149*** 




Appendix 1.5 Variables and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Regulatory 
Burden  
Percent of senior management’s time in 2001 was spent in dealing with 
public officials about the application and interpretation of laws and 
regulations and to get or to maintain access to public services, % 
 
BEEPS2 
Corruption On average,  percent of total annual sales do firm’s like yours typically pay 
in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials, %  
 
BEEPS2 
State Capture In a given year,  how often a firm like yours would make payments/gifts to  
influence the content of new legislation rules decrees etc. 





How problematic is the access to financing or financing not available from 
banks for the operation and growth of your business. No obstacle=1, Minor 
obstacle=2, Moderate obstacle=3, Major obstacle=4  
 
BEEPS2 
Firms' Age 2002 minus year the firm began operations in the country 
 
BEEPS2 
Ln (Size) Log of the number of employees  
 
BEEPS2 
State Dummy equal to 1if the legal organization is state/municipal/district-owned 
enterprise, and state ownership is share is more than 50% 
 
BEEPS2 











If you were to raise your prices of your main product line or main 
line of services 10% above their current level in the domestic market 
(after allowing for any inflation) which of the following would best 
describe the result assuming that your competitors maintained their 
current prices? 
Our customers would continue to buy from us in the same quantities 
as now = 1 
Our customers would continue to buy from us, but at slightly lower 
quantities = 2 
Customers would continue to buy from us, but at much lower 
quantities = 3 




Big City Dummy equal to 1: if over 1 million 
Medium City                                   250 000 – 1 000 000 
Small City                                  50 000 – 250 000 
Town/Village                                  under 50 000  







How problematic are these different factors for the operation and growth of 
your business: Telecommunications, Electricity and Transportation. No 
obstacle=1, Minor obstacle=2, Moderate obstacle=3, Major obstacle=4. 











World Bank Index in 2002: “Regulatory Quality focuses more on the 
policies themselves, including measures of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as 
well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas 


















Unweighted average of responses for the question: 
To what extent have the following practices had a direct impact on your 
business: a) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Parliamentarians to 
affect their votes; b) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Government 
officials to affect the content of government decrees; c) Private 
payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions of criminal 
court cases 
d) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions 
in commercial cases; e) Private payments/gifts or other benefits to central 
bank officials to affect central bank policies and decision; f) Illegal 
contributions to political parties and/or election campaigns to affect the 
decisions of elected officials 








Dummies based on categories made by Freedom House Freedom 
House 
Growth GDP growth rate in 2000 EBRD 





















Variables Definitions and Sources 
 
A. Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres): RGDPL from Penn World Tables 
 
RGDPL is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and 
subtracting imports in any given year. The given year components are obtained by 
extrapolating the 1996 values in international dollars from the Geary aggregation using 
national growth rates. It is a fixed base index where the reference year is 1996, hence the 
designation "L" for Laspeyeres. 
 
B. Political Events: From the Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(Banks-CNTS): 
  
 (Moderate) Unrest: aggregated measure is a combination of Demonstrations, General 
Strikes, and Riots defined below. 
1. General Strikes: The number of any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service 
workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority. 
2. Anti Government Demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 
100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-
foreign nature. 
3. Riots:  Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force. 
Violent Unrest: aggregated measure is a combination of guerrilla warfare and revolutions. 
4. Guerrilla Warfare: Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of 
the present regime.  
5. Revolutions: Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any 
attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion 
whose aim is independence from the central government. 
Government Changes – aggregated measure is not used. 
6. Coups d'Etat: The number of extra constitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure in a 
given year. The term "coup" includes, but is not exhausted by, the term 
"successful revolution". Unsuccessful coups are not counted.  
7. Changes in Effective Executive: The number of times in a year that effective 
control of the executive power changes hands.  Such a change requires that the 
new executive be independent of his predecessor. 
8. Number of Cabinet Changes: The number of times in a year that a new premier 




9. Government Crises:  Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 




10. Assassinations: Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician. 
 
C. Political System Measures (Banks-CNTS 2002). 
 
1. Type of Regime (Banks-CNTS measure) 
 
(1) Civilian.  Any government controlled by a nonmilitary component of the nation's 
population. 
(2) Military-Civilian.  Outwardly civilian government effectively controlled by a 
military elite.  Civilians hold only those posts (up to and including that of Chief of 
State) for which their services are deemed necessary for successful conduct of 
government operations.  An example would be retention of the Emperor and 
selected civilian cabinet members during the period of Japanese military 
hegemony between 1932 and 1945.  
(3) Military. Direct rule by the military, usually (but not necessarily) following a 
military coup d’état.  The governing structure may vary from utilization of the 
military chain of command under conditions of martial law to the institution of an 
ad hoc administrative hierarchy with at least an upper echelon staffed by military 
personnel.  
(4) Other. All regimes not falling into one or another of the foregoing categories, 
including instances in which a country, save for reasons of exogenous influence, 
lacks an effective national government. 
 
Military Regime Indicator (used in the regression analysis) 
 = 1 if the above CNTS’s Type  of Regime = (2) or (3) and zero otherwise. 
  
2. Legislative effectiveness:  
 
(0) None. No legislature exists.  
(1) Ineffective. There are three possible bases for this coding: first, legislative activity 
may be essentially of a "rubber stamp" character; second, domestic turmoil may 
make the implementation of legislation impossible; third, the effective executive 
may prevent the legislature from meeting, or otherwise substantially impede the 
exercise of its functions.  
(2) Partially Effective. A situation in which the effective executives power 
substantially outweighs, but does not completely dominate that of the legislature.  
(3) Effective. The possession of significant governmental autonomy by the 
legislature, including, typically, substantial authority in regard to taxation and 




3. Party Legitimacy (Banks-CNTS Measure): 
(0) No parties, or all but dominant party and satellites excluded 
(1) Significant exclusion of parties (or groups) 
(2) One or more minor or "extremist" parties excluded 
(3) No parties excluded 
 
Measure below is constructed and used in the regression analysis: 
 
Party Legitimacy = 1 if Banks-CNTS Measure = (2) or (3), and zero otherwise. 
 
4. Party Coalitions (Banks-CNTS measure): 
   
(0) No coalition, no opposition 
(1) More than one party, government coalition, no opposition 
(2) More than one party, government coalition, opposition 
(3) More than one party, no coalitions 
 
D. Democracy: POLITY2 variable  
 
Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC 
score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). POLITY2 is Revised Combined Polity 
Score. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or 
““fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to 
conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).  
 
Regime Dummies (Marshall and Gurr (2003)): 
Democracy =1 if Polity2 score ≥ 6, and 0 otherwise 
Autocracy =1 if Poltiy2 score ≤ -6, and 0 otherwise 
Anocracy =1 if -5 ≤ Polity2 ≤ 5, and 0 otherwise 
 
 E. Ethnic Fractionalization (from Alesina et al. 2003) 
The variable is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares, and 
reflected the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 




Urban population (% of total), from World Development Indicators 
 
F. Data from Miguel et al. (2004). 
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Civil Conflict ≥25 deaths 
 
Any Internal War or Any Internationalized Internal War. Dichotomous variable. 
PRIO/Uppsala define Minor Conflict, Intermediate Conflict, and War as follows: 
 
• Minor Armed Conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 
  1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict. 
• Intermediate Armed Conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an 
   accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year. 
• War: At least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
G. Countries by region 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 




 Europe  
1. Barbados  
2. Chile  
3. Costa Rica 
4. Dominican  
Republic  
5. El Salvador 
6. Guatemala  
7. Guyana  
8. Haiti  
9. Honduras  




14. Benin  
15. Botswana  
16. Burkina Faso 
17. Burundi  
18. Cape Verde 
19. Central African Rep. 
20. Chad 
21. Comoros  
22. Congo, Dem. Rep 
23. Equatorial Guinea 
24. Ethiopia 
25. Gambia, The  
26. Ghana  
27. Guinea  
28. Guinea-Bissau 
29. Madagascar   




34. Mozambique  
35. Namibia  
36. Niger  
37. Rwanda  
38. Sierra Leone  
39. South Africa 
40. Tanzania  
41. Togo  
42. Uganda  
43. Zambia  
44. Zimbabwe 
45. Fiji 
46. Korea, Rep. 
47. New Zealand
48. Philippines   
49. Thailand 
50. Bangladesh 
51. Nepal  
52. Pakistan  
53. Sri Lanka 
54. Turkey  




59. Belgium  
60. Cyprus  
61. Iceland   
62. Luxembourg 
63. Ireland  
64. Switzerland 
65. Sweden  
66. Greece  
67. Portugal 
        
Table A2.1 Political Events Correlations: measured as number of events in a given year              
         
 
 Gen.Strikes AntiGovDem Riots GuerrillWar. Revolutions Gov. Crises Assassin. Coups ChangeExec. CabChanges 
           
General Strikes 1          
Anti Gov. Demonst. 0.2810* 1         
Riots  0.2598* 0.6881* 1        
Guerrilla Warfare 0.0577* 0.0563* 0.1051* 1       
Revolutions 0.1089* 0.1131* 0.0912* 0.3246* 1      
Government Crises 0.1485* 0.1906* 0.2567* 0.2202* 0.1708* 1     
Assassinations 0.1208* 0.1248* 0.1236* 0.2265* 0.1978* 0.1503* 1    
Successful Coups 0.0579* 0.0159 0.0525* 0.0192 0.3561* 0.1407* 0.0365 1   
Change in Executive 0.0734* 0.0626* 0.1063* 0.0433* 0.2063* 0.2712* 0.1008* 0.4265* 1  
Cabinet Changes  0.0653* 0.1075* 0.1179* 0.0704* 0.2432* 0.2836* 0.0541* 0.2758* 0.4648* 1 
           
* significant at 5% 
 
Table A2.2  Political Events Correlations: measured as dummy variables, 1  if events happened in a given year    
 
 
 Gen.Strikes AntiGovDem Riots GuerrillWar. Revolutions Gov. Crises Assassin. Coups ChangeExec. CabChanges 
           
General Strikes 1          
Anti Gov. Demonst. 0.3280* 1         
Riots  0.2909* 0.4965* 1        
Guerrilla Warfare 0.0627* 0.1356* 0.1504* 1       
Revolutions 0.0743* 0.1220* 0.0850* 0.4047* 1      
Government Crises 0.2077* 0.2448* 0.2493* 0.1275* 0.1384* 1     
Assassinations 0.1490* 0.2573* 0.2035* 0.3024* 0.2107* 0.1474* 1    
Successful Coups 0.0569* 0.0214 0.0479* 0.0569* 0.3874* 0.1402* 0.0670* 1   
Change in Executive 0.0680* 0.0856* 0.1176* 0.0585* 0.2158* 0.2762* 0.1240* 0.4330* 1  
Cabinet Changes  0.0424* 0.0832* 0.0987* 0.032 0.1792* 0.2009* 0.1027* 0.2259* 0.4627* 1 
           
* significant at 5% 
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Table A2.3 Effect of Economic Growth on Probability Unrest by Regions: OLS and IV-2SLS 
Dependent Variable  Unrest, OLS   Unrest by Different Regions, IV-2SLS 




















Growth t -0.564 -0.102 -0.547 -1.938 -2.443 12.14 5.46 -6.38 133.2 -1.70 
 [0.298]* [0.122] [0.764] [0.665]* [0.520]*** [9.32] [4.27] [10.60] [796.3] [2.45] 
Democracyt-1  0.04 -0.123 -0.078 0.278 -0.47 -0.1 -0.16 -0.16 -2.05 -0.44 
(Anocracy omitted) [0.105] [0.062]* [0.121] [0.133] [0.194]** [0.22] [0.12] [0.21] [14.8] [0.18]** 
Autocracyt-1 -0.172 -0.112 0.053 -0.19 0.539 0.17 -0.16 -0.03 5.02 0.49 
 [0.079]* [0.048]** [0.096] [0.095] [0.180]** [0.23] [0.10] [0.21] [31.28] [0.27] 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.378 0.293 -0.509 1.586 -0.118 -0.06 0.64 -0.63 -24.02 -0.12 
 [0.451] [0.202] [0.164]** [0.311]** [0.458] [0.90] [0.44] [0.37] [155.3] [0.44] 
Military Regimet-1  -0.336 -0.053 0.153 -0.296 -0.352 -0.18 -0.13 0.21 0.47 -0.35 
 [0.183]* [0.037] [0.102] [0.073]** [0.154]* [0.30] [0.10] [0.19] [4.92] [0.15]** 
Urbanization 1.37 0.594 -0.256 -0.91 0.922 1.16 0.57 -0.14 0.45 0.91 
 [0.208]*** [0.144]*** [0.294] [0.085]*** [0.430]* [0.45]** [0.28]** [0.40] [9.39] [0.41]* 
Legislative  -0.128 -0.026 -0.044 0.033 -0.207 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 2.73 -0.21 
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.092] [0.028] [0.063] [0.091] [0.110] [0.16] [0.07] [0.06] [16.3] [0.10]* 
Party Coalitionst-1 -0.028 0.038 0.134 -0.093 -0.147 -0.11 0.001 0.12 0.63 -0.15 
 [0.042] [0.015]** [0.033]*** [0.106] [0.051]** [0.11] [0.03] [0.03]*** [5.11] [0.05]** 
Party Legitimacyt-1 -0.037 -0.095 -0.111 0.462 1.145 0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -5.16 1.10 
 [0.138] [0.068] [0.047]** [0.104]** [0.091]*** [0.20] [0.10] [0.06]* [34.7] [0.17]*** 
           
Country dummies No No No No No No No No No No 
Trend*country  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Observations 453 1002 317 155 296 453 1002 317 155 296 
R2  0.15 0.23 0.28 0.38 0.25      
F test of excl. instr. --- --- ---   1.52 1.32 2.82 0.01 7.76 
p-value --- --- ---   (0.2179) (0.2516) (0.0941) (0.9371) (0.0057) 
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets, p-values in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    
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Table A2.4 Effect of Economic Growth on Probability of Other Events: OLS and IV-2SLS 
Dependent Variable: 
Events 































Growth t -0.28 -0.27 -0.6 -0.22  -0.28 -1.21 -1.92 -3.06  
 [0.11]** [0.13]** [0.16]*** [0.13]*  [1.14] [1.98] [2.40] [2.01]  
Democracyt-1  0.01 -0.02 -0.1 -0.05  0.01 -0.02 -0.1 -0.05  
(Anocracy omitted) [0.02] [0.04] [0.05]* [0.04]  [0.02] [0.04] [0.05]* [0.05]  
Autocracyt-1 -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.02  -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.04  
 [0.02]** [0.03]*** [0.04]* [0.04]  [0.02]* [0.04]*** [0.04]** [0.04]  
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.08  0.06 0.1 0.14 0.03  
 [0.06] [0.13] [0.18] [0.10]  [0.06] [0.14] [0.19] [0.13]  
Military Regimet-1  -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.04  -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.02  
 [0.02]** [0.04] [0.05] [0.03]  [0.02]** [0.04] [0.05] [0.03]  
Urbanization -0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.07  -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.03  
 [0.05] [0.13] [0.18] [0.13]  [0.05] [0.15] [0.19] [0.13]  
Legislative  -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  
     Effectivenesst-1 [0.01]*** [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.01]*** [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]  
Party Coalitionst-1 0 -0.03 -0.04 0.01  0 -0.02 -0.04 0.02  
 [0.01] [0.01]** [0.02]** [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]* [0.02]* [0.01]  
Party Legitimacyt-1 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.02  -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.03  
 [0.02] [0.04] [0.05]* [0.05]  [0.02] [0.04] [0.05]* [0.05]  
Regional Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Country dummies No No No No  No No No No  
Trend*country  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 2251 2251 2246 2223  2251 2251 2246 2223  
R2  0.065 0.085 0.138 0.199  -- -- -- --  
F test of excl . instr.      7.73 7.73 7.73 7.73  
p-value      (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)  
















Bangladesh -0.053 0.021 ** Madagascar -0.010 0.007   
Belgium -0.028 0.012 ** Malawi -0.034 0.018 * 
Benin -0.064 0.012 *** Mali 0.031 0.029   
Botswana -0.009 0.018   Mauritania -0.057 0.011 *** 
Burkina Faso 0.007 0.019   Mauritius -0.031 0.026   
Burundi -0.030 0.027   Morocco 0.010 0.010   
Centr. Afr. Rep. -0.031 0.017 * Mozambique -0.335 0.054 *** 
Chad 0.034 0.038   Namibia 0.985 0.694   
Chile -0.148 0.025 *** Nepal 0.012 0.035   
Comoros -0.041 0.031   New Zealand -0.048 0.005 *** 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.038 0.016 ** Nicaragua 0.021 0.023   
Costa Rica -0.017 0.012   Niger -0.041 0.038   
Cyprus -0.160 0.022 *** Pakistan 0.007 0.016   
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